1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948
949
950
951
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961
962
963
964
965
966
967
968
969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
980
981
982
983
984
985
986
987
988
989
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
997
998
999
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004
1005
1006
1007
1008
1009
1010
1011
1012
1013
1014
1015
1016
1017
1018
1019
1020
1021
1022
1023
1024
1025
1026
1027
1028
1029
1030
1031
1032
1033
1034
1035
1036
1037
1038
1039
1040
1041
1042
1043
1044
1045
1046
1047
1048
1049
1050
1051
1052
1053
1054
1055
1056
1057
1058
1059
1060
1061
1062
1063
1064
1065
1066
1067
1068
1069
1070
1071
1072
1073
1074
1075
1076
1077
1078
1079
1080
1081
1082
1083
1084
1085
1086
1087
1088
1089
1090
1091
1092
1093
1094
1095
1096
1097
1098
1099
1100
1101
1102
1103
1104
1105
1106
1107
1108
1109
1110
1111
1112
1113
1114
1115
1116
1117
1118
1119
1120
1121
1122
1123
1124
1125
1126
1127
1128
1129
1130
1131
1132
1133
1134
1135
1136
1137
1138
1139
1140
1141
1142
1143
1144
1145
1146
1147
1148
1149
1150
1151
1152
1153
1154
1155
1156
1157
1158
1159
1160
1161
1162
1163
1164
1165
1166
1167
1168
1169
1170
1171
1172
1173
1174
1175
1176
1177
1178
1179
1180
1181
1182
1183
1184
1185
1186
1187
1188
1189
1190
1191
1192
1193
1194
1195
1196
1197
1198
1199
1200
1201
1202
1203
1204
1205
1206
1207
1208
1209
1210
1211
1212
1213
1214
1215
1216
1217
1218
1219
1220
1221
1222
1223
1224
1225
1226
1227
1228
1229
1230
1231
1232
1233
1234
1235
1236
1237
1238
1239
1240
1241
1242
1243
1244
1245
1246
1247
1248
1249
1250
1251
1252
1253
1254
1255
1256
1257
1258
1259
1260
1261
1262
1263
1264
1265
1266
1267
1268
1269
1270
1271
1272
1273
1274
1275
1276
1277
1278
1279
1280
1281
1282
1283
1284
1285
1286
1287
1288
1289
1290
1291
1292
1293
1294
1295
1296
1297
1298
1299
1300
1301
1302
1303
1304
1305
1306
1307
1308
1309
1310
1311
1312
1313
1314
1315
1316
1317
1318
1319
1320
1321
1322
1323
1324
1325
1326
1327
1328
1329
1330
1331
1332
1333
1334
1335
1336
1337
1338
1339
1340
1341
1342
1343
1344
1345
1346
1347
1348
1349
1350
1351
1352
1353
1354
1355
1356
1357
1358
1359
1360
1361
1362
1363
1364
1365
1366
1367
1368
1369
1370
1371
1372
1373
1374
1375
1376
1377
1378
1379
1380
1381
1382
1383
1384
1385
1386
1387
1388
1389
1390
1391
1392
1393
1394
1395
1396
1397
1398
1399
1400
1401
1402
1403
1404
1405
1406
1407
1408
1409
1410
1411
1412
1413
1414
1415
1416
1417
1418
1419
1420
1421
1422
1423
1424
1425
1426
1427
1428
1429
1430
1431
1432
1433
1434
1435
1436
1437
1438
1439
1440
1441
1442
1443
1444
1445
1446
1447
1448
1449
1450
1451
1452
1453
1454
1455
1456
1457
1458
1459
1460
1461
1462
1463
1464
1465
1466
1467
1468
1469
1470
1471
1472
1473
1474
1475
1476
1477
1478
1479
1480
1481
1482
1483
1484
1485
1486
1487
1488
1489
1490
1491
1492
1493
1494
1495
1496
1497
1498
1499
1500
1501
1502
1503
1504
1505
1506
1507
1508
1509
1510
1511
1512
1513
1514
1515
1516
1517
1518
1519
1520
1521
1522
1523
1524
1525
1526
1527
1528
1529
1530
1531
1532
1533
1534
1535
1536
1537
1538
1539
1540
1541
1542
1543
1544
1545
1546
1547
1548
1549
1550
1551
1552
1553
1554
1555
1556
1557
1558
1559
1560
1561
1562
1563
1564
1565
1566
1567
1568
1569
1570
1571
1572
1573
1574
1575
1576
1577
1578
1579
1580
1581
1582
1583
1584
1585
1586
1587
1588
1589
1590
1591
1592
1593
1594
1595
1596
1597
1598
1599
1600
1601
1602
1603
1604
1605
1606
1607
1608
1609
1610
1611
1612
1613
1614
1615
1616
1617
1618
1619
1620
1621
1622
1623
1624
1625
1626
1627
1628
1629
1630
1631
1632
1633
1634
1635
1636
1637
1638
1639
1640
1641
1642
1643
1644
1645
1646
1647
1648
1649
1650
1651
1652
1653
1654
1655
1656
1657
1658
1659
1660
1661
1662
1663
1664
1665
1666
1667
1668
1669
1670
1671
1672
1673
1674
1675
1676
1677
1678
1679
1680
1681
1682
1683
1684
1685
1686
1687
1688
1689
1690
1691
1692
1693
1694
1695
1696
1697
1698
1699
1700
1701
1702
1703
1704
1705
1706
1707
1708
1709
1710
1711
1712
1713
1714
1715
1716
1717
1718
1719
1720
1721
1722
1723
1724
1725
1726
1727
1728
1729
1730
1731
1732
1733
1734
1735
1736
1737
1738
1739
1740
1741
1742
1743
1744
1745
1746
1747
1748
1749
1750
1751
1752
1753
1754
1755
1756
1757
1758
1759
1760
1761
1762
1763
1764
1765
1766
1767
1768
1769
1770
1771
1772
1773
1774
1775
1776
1777
1778
1779
1780
1781
1782
1783
1784
1785
1786
1787
1788
1789
1790
1791
1792
1793
1794
1795
1796
1797
1798
1799
1800
1801
1802
1803
1804
1805
1806
1807
1808
1809
1810
1811
1812
1813
1814
1815
1816
1817
1818
1819
1820
1821
1822
1823
1824
1825
1826
1827
1828
1829
1830
1831
1832
1833
1834
1835
1836
1837
1838
1839
1840
1841
1842
1843
1844
1845
1846
1847
1848
1849
1850
1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
2042
2043
2044
2045
2046
2047
2048
2049
2050
2051
2052
2053
2054
2055
2056
2057
2058
2059
2060
2061
2062
2063
2064
2065
2066
2067
2068
2069
2070
2071
2072
2073
2074
2075
2076
2077
2078
2079
2080
2081
2082
2083
2084
2085
2086
2087
2088
2089
2090
2091
2092
2093
2094
2095
2096
2097
2098
2099
2100
2101
2102
2103
2104
2105
2106
2107
2108
2109
2110
2111
2112
2113
2114
2115
2116
2117
2118
2119
2120
2121
2122
2123
2124
2125
2126
2127
2128
2129
2130
2131
2132
2133
2134
2135
2136
2137
2138
2139
2140
2141
2142
2143
2144
2145
2146
2147
2148
2149
2150
2151
2152
2153
2154
2155
2156
2157
2158
2159
2160
2161
2162
2163
2164
2165
2166
2167
2168
2169
2170
2171
2172
2173
2174
2175
2176
2177
2178
2179
2180
2181
2182
2183
2184
2185
2186
2187
2188
2189
2190
2191
2192
2193
2194
2195
2196
2197
2198
2199
2200
2201
2202
2203
2204
2205
2206
2207
2208
2209
2210
2211
2212
2213
2214
2215
2216
2217
2218
2219
2220
2221
2222
2223
2224
2225
2226
2227
2228
2229
2230
2231
2232
2233
2234
2235
2236
2237
2238
2239
2240
2241
2242
2243
2244
2245
2246
2247
2248
2249
2250
2251
2252
2253
2254
2255
2256
2257
2258
2259
2260
2261
2262
2263
2264
2265
2266
2267
2268
2269
2270
2271
2272
2273
2274
2275
2276
2277
2278
2279
2280
2281
2282
2283
2284
2285
2286
2287
2288
2289
2290
2291
2292
2293
2294
2295
2296
2297
2298
2299
2300
2301
2302
2303
2304
2305
2306
2307
2308
2309
2310
2311
2312
2313
2314
2315
2316
2317
2318
2319
2320
2321
2322
2323
2324
2325
2326
2327
2328
2329
2330
2331
2332
2333
2334
2335
2336
2337
2338
2339
2340
2341
2342
2343
2344
2345
2346
2347
2348
2349
2350
2351
2352
2353
2354
2355
2356
2357
2358
2359
2360
2361
2362
2363
2364
2365
2366
2367
2368
2369
2370
2371
2372
2373
2374
2375
2376
2377
2378
2379
2380
2381
2382
2383
2384
2385
2386
2387
2388
2389
2390
2391
2392
2393
2394
2395
2396
2397
2398
2399
2400
2401
2402
2403
2404
2405
2406
2407
2408
2409
2410
2411
2412
2413
2414
2415
2416
2417
2418
2419
2420
2421
2422
2423
2424
2425
2426
2427
2428
2429
2430
2431
2432
2433
2434
2435
2436
2437
2438
2439
2440
2441
2442
2443
2444
2445
2446
2447
2448
2449
2450
2451
2452
2453
2454
2455
2456
2457
2458
2459
2460
2461
2462
2463
2464
2465
2466
2467
2468
2469
2470
2471
2472
2473
2474
2475
2476
2477
2478
2479
2480
2481
2482
2483
2484
2485
2486
2487
2488
2489
2490
2491
2492
2493
2494
2495
2496
2497
2498
2499
2500
2501
2502
2503
2504
2505
2506
2507
2508
2509
2510
2511
2512
2513
2514
2515
2516
2517
2518
2519
2520
2521
2522
2523
2524
2525
2526
2527
2528
2529
2530
2531
2532
2533
2534
2535
2536
2537
2538
2539
2540
2541
2542
2543
2544
2545
2546
2547
2548
2549
2550
2551
2552
2553
2554
2555
2556
2557
2558
2559
2560
2561
2562
2563
2564
2565
2566
2567
2568
2569
2570
2571
2572
2573
2574
2575
2576
2577
2578
2579
2580
2581
2582
2583
2584
2585
2586
2587
2588
2589
2590
2591
2592
2593
2594
2595
2596
2597
2598
2599
2600
2601
2602
2603
2604
2605
2606
2607
2608
2609
2610
2611
2612
2613
2614
2615
2616
2617
2618
2619
2620
2621
2622
2623
2624
2625
2626
2627
2628
2629
2630
2631
2632
2633
2634
2635
2636
2637
2638
2639
2640
2641
2642
2643
2644
2645
2646
2647
2648
2649
2650
2651
2652
2653
2654
2655
2656
2657
2658
2659
2660
2661
2662
2663
2664
2665
2666
2667
2668
2669
2670
2671
2672
2673
2674
2675
2676
2677
2678
2679
2680
2681
2682
2683
2684
2685
2686
2687
2688
2689
2690
2691
2692
2693
2694
2695
2696
2697
2698
2699
2700
2701
2702
2703
2704
2705
2706
2707
2708
2709
2710
2711
2712
2713
2714
2715
2716
2717
2718
2719
2720
2721
2722
2723
2724
2725
2726
2727
2728
2729
2730
2731
2732
2733
2734
2735
2736
2737
2738
2739
2740
2741
2742
2743
2744
2745
2746
2747
2748
2749
2750
2751
2752
2753
2754
2755
2756
2757
2758
2759
2760
2761
2762
2763
2764
2765
2766
2767
2768
2769
2770
2771
2772
2773
2774
2775
2776
2777
2778
2779
2780
2781
2782
2783
2784
2785
2786
2787
2788
2789
2790
2791
2792
2793
2794
2795
2796
2797
2798
2799
2800
2801
2802
2803
2804
2805
2806
2807
2808
2809
2810
2811
2812
2813
2814
2815
2816
2817
2818
2819
2820
2821
2822
2823
2824
2825
2826
2827
2828
2829
2830
2831
2832
2833
2834
2835
2836
2837
2838
2839
2840
2841
2842
2843
2844
2845
2846
2847
2848
2849
2850
2851
2852
2853
2854
2855
2856
2857
2858
2859
2860
2861
2862
2863
2864
2865
2866
2867
2868
2869
2870
2871
2872
2873
2874
2875
2876
2877
2878
2879
2880
2881
2882
2883
2884
2885
2886
2887
2888
2889
2890
2891
2892
2893
2894
2895
2896
2897
2898
2899
2900
2901
2902
2903
2904
2905
2906
2907
2908
2909
2910
2911
2912
2913
2914
2915
2916
2917
2918
2919
2920
2921
2922
2923
2924
2925
2926
2927
2928
2929
2930
2931
2932
2933
2934
2935
2936
2937
2938
2939
2940
2941
2942
2943
2944
2945
2946
2947
2948
2949
2950
2951
2952
2953
2954
2955
2956
2957
2958
2959
2960
2961
2962
2963
2964
2965
2966
2967
2968
2969
2970
2971
2972
2973
2974
2975
2976
2977
2978
2979
2980
2981
2982
2983
2984
2985
2986
2987
2988
2989
2990
2991
2992
2993
2994
2995
2996
2997
2998
2999
3000
3001
3002
3003
3004
3005
3006
3007
3008
3009
3010
3011
3012
3013
3014
3015
3016
3017
3018
3019
3020
3021
3022
3023
3024
3025
3026
3027
3028
3029
3030
3031
3032
3033
3034
3035
3036
3037
3038
3039
3040
3041
3042
3043
3044
3045
3046
3047
3048
3049
3050
3051
3052
3053
3054
3055
3056
3057
3058
3059
3060
3061
3062
3063
3064
3065
3066
3067
3068
3069
3070
3071
3072
3073
3074
3075
3076
3077
3078
3079
3080
3081
3082
3083
3084
3085
3086
3087
3088
3089
3090
3091
3092
3093
3094
3095
3096
3097
3098
3099
3100
3101
3102
3103
3104
3105
3106
3107
3108
3109
3110
3111
3112
3113
3114
3115
3116
3117
3118
3119
3120
3121
3122
3123
3124
3125
3126
3127
3128
3129
3130
3131
3132
3133
3134
3135
3136
3137
3138
3139
3140
3141
3142
3143
3144
3145
3146
3147
3148
3149
3150
3151
3152
3153
3154
3155
3156
3157
3158
3159
3160
3161
3162
3163
3164
3165
3166
3167
3168
3169
3170
3171
3172
3173
3174
3175
3176
3177
3178
3179
3180
3181
3182
3183
3184
3185
3186
3187
3188
3189
3190
3191
3192
3193
3194
3195
3196
3197
3198
3199
3200
3201
3202
3203
3204
3205
3206
3207
3208
3209
3210
3211
3212
content / browser / child_process_security_policy_unittest.cc [blame]
// Copyright 2012 The Chromium Authors
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include <set>
#include <string>
#include <string_view>
#include "base/containers/contains.h"
#include "base/files/file_path.h"
#include "base/functional/callback_helpers.h"
#include "base/logging.h"
#include "base/memory/raw_ptr.h"
#include "base/memory/ref_counted.h"
#include "base/ranges/algorithm.h"
#include "base/synchronization/waitable_event.h"
#include "base/test/bind.h"
#include "base/test/gtest_util.h"
#include "base/test/mock_log.h"
#include "base/test/scoped_command_line.h"
#include "base/test/scoped_feature_list.h"
#include "build/build_config.h"
#include "content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.h"
#include "content/browser/isolated_origin_util.h"
#include "content/browser/origin_agent_cluster_isolation_state.h"
#include "content/browser/process_lock.h"
#include "content/browser/site_info.h"
#include "content/browser/site_instance_impl.h"
#include "content/common/content_navigation_policy.h"
#include "content/common/features.h"
#include "content/public/browser/browser_task_traits.h"
#include "content/public/browser/browser_thread.h"
#include "content/public/browser/site_isolation_policy.h"
#include "content/public/common/bindings_policy.h"
#include "content/public/common/content_client.h"
#include "content/public/common/content_features.h"
#include "content/public/common/content_switches.h"
#include "content/public/common/url_constants.h"
#include "content/public/test/browser_task_environment.h"
#include "content/public/test/test_browser_context.h"
#include "content/public/test/test_utils.h"
#include "content/test/storage_partition_test_helpers.h"
#include "content/test/test_content_browser_client.h"
#include "net/base/filename_util.h"
#include "storage/browser/file_system/file_permission_policy.h"
#include "storage/browser/file_system/file_system_url.h"
#include "storage/browser/file_system/isolated_context.h"
#include "storage/common/file_system/file_system_types.h"
#include "testing/gmock/include/gmock/gmock.h"
#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h"
#include "third_party/blink/public/common/storage_key/storage_key.h"
#include "url/gurl.h"
#include "url/origin.h"
namespace content {
namespace {
using IsolatedOriginSource = ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::IsolatedOriginSource;
const int kRendererID = 42;
#if defined(FILE_PATH_USES_DRIVE_LETTERS)
#define TEST_PATH(x) FILE_PATH_LITERAL("c:") FILE_PATH_LITERAL(x)
#else
#define TEST_PATH(x) FILE_PATH_LITERAL(x)
#endif
class ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTestBrowserClient
: public TestContentBrowserClient {
public:
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTestBrowserClient() {}
bool IsHandledURL(const GURL& url) override {
return base::Contains(schemes_, url.scheme());
}
void ClearSchemes() {
schemes_.clear();
}
void AddScheme(const std::string& scheme) {
schemes_.insert(scheme);
}
private:
std::set<std::string> schemes_;
};
void LockProcessIfNeeded(int process_id,
BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& url) {
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> site_instance =
SiteInstanceImpl::CreateForTesting(browser_context, url);
if (site_instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess() &&
site_instance->GetSiteInfo().ShouldLockProcessToSite(
site_instance->GetIsolationContext())) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()->LockProcess(
site_instance->GetIsolationContext(), process_id, false,
ProcessLock::FromSiteInfo(site_instance->GetSiteInfo()));
}
}
} // namespace
class ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest : public testing::Test {
public:
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest()
: task_environment_(BrowserTaskEnvironment::REAL_IO_THREAD),
old_browser_client_(nullptr) {
}
void SetUp() override {
old_browser_client_ = SetBrowserClientForTesting(&test_browser_client_);
// Claim to always handle chrome:// URLs because the CPSP's notion of
// allowing WebUI bindings is hard-wired to this particular scheme.
test_browser_client_.AddScheme(kChromeUIScheme);
// Claim to always handle file:// and android content:// URLs like the
// browser would. net::URLRequest::IsHandledURL() no longer claims support
// for default protocols as this is the responsibility of the browser (which
// is responsible for adding the appropriate ProtocolHandler).
test_browser_client_.AddScheme(url::kFileScheme);
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_ANDROID)
test_browser_client_.AddScheme(url::kContentScheme);
#endif
SiteIsolationPolicy::DisableFlagCachingForTesting();
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
{
base::AutoLock lock(policy->lock_);
EXPECT_EQ(0u, policy->security_state_.size())
<< "ChildProcessSecurityPolicy should not be tracking any processes "
<< "at test startup. Some other test probably forgot to call "
<< "Remove() at the end.";
}
}
void TearDown() override {
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
{
base::AutoLock lock(policy->lock_);
EXPECT_EQ(0u, policy->security_state_.size())
<< "ChildProcessSecurityPolicy should not be tracking any processes "
<< "at test shutdown. Did you forget to call Remove() at the end of "
<< "a test?";
}
test_browser_client_.ClearSchemes();
SetBrowserClientForTesting(old_browser_client_);
}
// Helpers to construct (key, value) entries used to validate the
// isolated_origins_ map. The key is a site URL, calculated from the
// provided origin, and the value is a list of IsolatedOriginEntries. These
// helpers are members of ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest so they can access
// the private IsolatedOriginEntry struct.
using IsolatedOriginEntry =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::IsolatedOriginEntry;
// Converts |browsing_instance_id|, |origin| -> (site_url, {entry}) where
// site_url is created from |origin|, and {entry} contains |origin|
// and |browsing_instance_id|.
auto GetIsolatedOriginEntry(BrowsingInstanceId browsing_instance_id,
const url::Origin& origin,
bool isolate_all_subdomains = false) {
return std::pair<GURL, std::vector<IsolatedOriginEntry>>(
SiteInfo::GetSiteForOrigin(origin),
{IsolatedOriginEntry(
origin, true /* applies_to_future_browsing_instances */,
browsing_instance_id, nullptr, nullptr, isolate_all_subdomains,
IsolatedOriginSource::TEST)});
}
auto GetIsolatedOriginEntry(int browsing_instance_id,
const url::Origin& origin,
bool isolate_all_subdomains = false) {
return GetIsolatedOriginEntry(BrowsingInstanceId(browsing_instance_id),
origin, isolate_all_subdomains);
}
// Converts the provided params into a (site_url, {entry}) tuple, where
// site_url is created from |origin| and {entry} contains |origin| and
// matches the provided BrowserContext, BrowsingInstance ID, and whether the
// isolation applies to future BrowsingInstances.
auto GetIsolatedOriginEntry(BrowserContext* browser_context,
bool applies_to_future_browsing_instances,
BrowsingInstanceId browsing_instance_id,
const url::Origin& origin) {
return std::pair<GURL, std::vector<IsolatedOriginEntry>>(
SiteInfo::GetSiteForOrigin(origin),
{IsolatedOriginEntry(
origin, applies_to_future_browsing_instances, browsing_instance_id,
browser_context,
browser_context ? browser_context->GetResourceContext() : nullptr,
false /* isolate_all_subdomains */, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST)});
}
// Converts |origin| -> (site_url, {entry})
// where site_url is created from |origin| and
// entry contains |origin| and the latest BrowsingInstance ID.
auto GetIsolatedOriginEntry(const url::Origin& origin,
bool isolate_all_subdomains = false) {
return GetIsolatedOriginEntry(SiteInstanceImpl::NextBrowsingInstanceId(),
origin, isolate_all_subdomains);
}
// Converts |origin1|, |origin2| -> (site_url, {entry1, entry2})
// where |site_url| is created from |origin1|, but is assumed to be the
// same for |origin2| (i.e., |origin1| and |origin2| are
// same-site),
// entry1 contains |origin1| and the latest BrowsingInstance ID,
// entry2 contains |origin2| and the latest BrowsingInstance ID.
auto GetIsolatedOriginEntry(const url::Origin& origin1,
const url::Origin& origin2,
bool origin1_isolate_all_subdomains = false,
bool origin2_isolate_all_subdomains = false) {
EXPECT_EQ(SiteInfo::GetSiteForOrigin(origin1),
SiteInfo::GetSiteForOrigin(origin2));
return std::pair<GURL, std::vector<IsolatedOriginEntry>>(
SiteInfo::GetSiteForOrigin(origin1),
{IsolatedOriginEntry(
origin1, true /* applies_to_future_browsing_contexts */,
SiteInstanceImpl::NextBrowsingInstanceId(), nullptr, nullptr,
origin1_isolate_all_subdomains, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST),
IsolatedOriginEntry(
origin2, true /* applies_to_future_browsing_contexts */,
SiteInstanceImpl::NextBrowsingInstanceId(), nullptr, nullptr,
origin2_isolate_all_subdomains, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST)});
}
bool IsIsolatedOrigin(BrowserContext* context,
int browsing_instance_id,
const url::Origin& origin) {
return IsIsolatedOrigin(context, BrowsingInstanceId(browsing_instance_id),
origin);
}
bool IsIsolatedOrigin(BrowserContext* context,
BrowsingInstanceId browsing_instance_id,
const url::Origin& origin) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
return p->IsIsolatedOrigin(
IsolationContext(
browsing_instance_id, context,
/*is_guest=*/false, /*is_fenced=*/false,
OriginAgentClusterIsolationState::CreateForDefaultIsolation(
&browser_context_)),
origin, false /* origin_requests_isolation */);
}
// Returns the number of isolated origin entries for a particular origin.
// There may be more than one such entry if each is associated with a
// different profile.
int GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(const url::Origin& origin) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
GURL key(SiteInfo::GetSiteForOrigin(origin));
base::AutoLock isolated_origins_lock(p->isolated_origins_lock_);
auto origins_for_key = p->isolated_origins_[key];
return base::ranges::count(origins_for_key, origin,
&IsolatedOriginEntry::origin);
}
void CheckGetSiteForURL(BrowserContext* context,
std::map<GURL, GURL> to_test) {
for (const auto& entry : to_test) {
auto site_info =
SiteInfo::CreateForTesting(IsolationContext(context), entry.first);
EXPECT_EQ(site_info.site_url(), entry.second);
}
}
protected:
void RegisterTestScheme(const std::string& scheme) {
test_browser_client_.AddScheme(scheme);
}
void GrantPermissionsForFile(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p,
int child_id,
const base::FilePath& file,
int permissions) {
p->GrantPermissionsForFile(child_id, file, permissions);
}
void CheckHasNoFileSystemPermission(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p,
const std::string& child_id) {
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanReadFileSystem(kRendererID, child_id));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanReadWriteFileSystem(kRendererID, child_id));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCopyIntoFileSystem(kRendererID, child_id));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanDeleteFromFileSystem(kRendererID, child_id));
}
void CheckHasNoFileSystemFilePermission(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p,
const base::FilePath& file,
const storage::FileSystemURL& url) {
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanReadFile(kRendererID, file));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCreateReadWriteFile(kRendererID, file));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanReadFileSystemFile(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanWriteFileSystemFile(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCreateFileSystemFile(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCreateReadWriteFileSystemFile(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCopyIntoFileSystemFile(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanDeleteFileSystemFile(kRendererID, url));
auto handle = p->CreateHandle(kRendererID);
EXPECT_FALSE(handle.CanReadFile(file));
EXPECT_FALSE(handle.CanReadFileSystemFile(url));
}
BrowserContext* browser_context() { return &browser_context_; }
private:
BrowserTaskEnvironment task_environment_;
TestBrowserContext browser_context_;
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTestBrowserClient test_browser_client_;
raw_ptr<ContentBrowserClient> old_browser_client_;
};
// A test class that forces kOriginKeyedProcessesByDefault off in
// ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest. Used for tests that are trying to verify
// behavior that is inconsistent with Origin Isolation.
class ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest_NoOriginKeyedProcessesByDefault
: public ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest {
public:
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest_NoOriginKeyedProcessesByDefault() {
feature_list_.InitAndDisableFeature(
features::kOriginKeyedProcessesByDefault);
}
private:
base::test::ScopedFeatureList feature_list_;
};
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, ChildID) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
auto handle = p->CreateHandle(kRendererID);
EXPECT_EQ(handle.child_id(), kRendererID);
p->Remove(kRendererID);
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, IsWebSafeSchemeTest) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(p->IsWebSafeScheme(url::kHttpScheme));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->IsWebSafeScheme(url::kHttpsScheme));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->IsWebSafeScheme(url::kDataScheme));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->IsWebSafeScheme(url::kBlobScheme));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->IsWebSafeScheme(url::kFileSystemScheme));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->IsWebSafeScheme("registered-web-safe-scheme"));
p->RegisterWebSafeScheme("registered-web-safe-scheme");
EXPECT_TRUE(p->IsWebSafeScheme("registered-web-safe-scheme"));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->IsWebSafeScheme(kChromeUIScheme));
p->ClearRegisteredSchemeForTesting("registered-web-safe-scheme");
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, IsPseudoSchemeTest) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
EXPECT_TRUE(p->IsPseudoScheme(url::kAboutScheme));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->IsPseudoScheme(url::kJavaScriptScheme));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->IsPseudoScheme(kViewSourceScheme));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->IsPseudoScheme(kGoogleChromeScheme));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->IsPseudoScheme("registered-pseudo-scheme"));
p->RegisterPseudoScheme("registered-pseudo-scheme");
EXPECT_TRUE(p->IsPseudoScheme("registered-pseudo-scheme"));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->IsPseudoScheme(kChromeUIScheme));
p->ClearRegisteredSchemeForTesting("registered-pseudo-scheme");
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, StandardSchemesTest) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
auto handle = p->CreateHandle(kRendererID);
// Safe to request, redirect or commit.
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("http://www.google.com/")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("https://www.paypal.com/")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("data:text/html,<b>Hi</b>")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(
kRendererID, GURL("filesystem:http://localhost/temporary/a.gif")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("http://www.google.com/")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("https://www.paypal.com/")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("data:text/html,<b>Hi</b>")));
EXPECT_TRUE(
p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("filesystem:http://localhost/temporary/a.gif")));
const std::vector<std::string> kCommitURLs({
"http://www.google.com/",
"https://www.paypal.com/",
"filesystem:http://localhost/temporary/a.gif",
});
for (const auto& url_string : kCommitURLs) {
const GURL commit_url(url_string);
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting()) {
// A non-locked process cannot access URL (because with
// site-per-process all the URLs need to be isolated).
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, commit_url)) << commit_url;
} else {
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, commit_url)) << commit_url;
}
}
// A data URL can commit in any process.
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("data:text/html,<b>Hi</b>")));
// Dangerous to request, commit, or set as origin header.
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID,
GURL("file:///etc/passwd")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GetWebUIURL("foo/bar")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID,
GURL("view-source:http://www.google.com/")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("file:///etc/passwd")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GetWebUIURL("foo/bar")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("view-source:http://www.google.com/")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL(kUnreachableWebDataURL)));
const std::vector<std::string> kFailedCommitURLs(
{"file:///etc/passwd", "view-source:http://www.google.com/",
kUnreachableWebDataURL, GetWebUIURL("foo/bar").spec()});
for (const auto& url_string : kFailedCommitURLs) {
const GURL commit_url(url_string);
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, commit_url)) << commit_url;
}
p->Remove(kRendererID);
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, BlobSchemeTest) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
GURL localhost_url("http://localhost/");
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
LockProcessIfNeeded(kRendererID, browser_context(), localhost_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(
p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("blob:http://localhost/some-guid")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("blob:null/some-guid")));
EXPECT_TRUE(
p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("blob:http://localhost/some-guid")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("blob:NulL/some-guid")));
EXPECT_TRUE(
p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("blob:NulL/some-guid#fragment")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("blob:NulL/some-guid?query")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(
kRendererID, GURL("blob:http://username@localhost/some-guid")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(
kRendererID, GURL("blob:http://username @localhost/some-guid")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("blob:blob:some-guid")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("blob:some-guid")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID,
GURL("blob:filesystem:http://localhost/path")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID,
GURL("filesystem:blob:http://localhost/guid")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("blob:http://localhost/some-guid")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("blob:null/some-guid")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("blob:http://localhost/some-guid")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("blob:NulL/some-guid")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("blob:NulL/some-guid#fragment")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("blob:NulL/some-guid?query")));
EXPECT_TRUE(
p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("blob:http://username@localhost/some-guid")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(
GURL("blob:http://username @localhost/some-guid")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("blob:blob:some-guid")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("blob:some-guid")));
EXPECT_TRUE(
p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("blob:filesystem:http://localhost/path")));
EXPECT_FALSE(
p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("filesystem:blob:http://localhost/guid")));
EXPECT_TRUE(
p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("blob:http://localhost/some-guid")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("blob:null/some-guid")));
EXPECT_TRUE(
p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("blob:http://localhost/some-guid")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("blob:NulL/some-guid")));
EXPECT_TRUE(
p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("blob:NulL/some-guid#fragment")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(
kRendererID, GURL("blob:http://username@localhost/some-guid")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(
kRendererID, GURL("blob:http://username @localhost/some-guid")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("blob:blob:some-guid")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("blob:some-guid")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID,
GURL("blob:filesystem:http://localhost/path")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID,
GURL("filesystem:blob:http://localhost/guid")));
p->Remove(kRendererID);
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, AboutTest) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("about:blank")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("about:BlAnK")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("aBouT:BlAnK")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("aBouT:blank")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("about:blank")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("about:BlAnK")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("aBouT:BlAnK")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("aBouT:blank")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("about:blank")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("about:BlAnK")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("aBouT:BlAnK")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("aBouT:blank")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("about:srcdoc")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("about:srcdoc")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("about:srcdoc")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("about:SRCDOC")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("about:SRCDOC")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("about:crash")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("about:cache")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("about:hang")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("about:version")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("about:crash")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("about:cache")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("about:hang")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("about:version")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("about:crash")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("about:cache")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("about:hang")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("about:version")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("aBoUt:version")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("about:CrASh")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("abOuT:cAChe")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("aBoUt:version")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("about:CrASh")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("abOuT:cAChe")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("aBoUt:version")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("about:CrASh")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("abOuT:cAChe")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("aBoUt:version")));
// Requests for about: pages should be denied.
p->GrantCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("about:crash"));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("about:crash")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("about:crash")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("about:crash")));
p->Remove(kRendererID);
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, JavaScriptTest) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("javascript:alert('xss')")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("javascript:alert('xss')")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("javascript:alert('xss')")));
p->GrantCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("javascript:alert('xss')"));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("javascript:alert('xss')")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("javascript:alert('xss')")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("javascript:alert('xss')")));
p->Remove(kRendererID);
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, RegisterWebSafeSchemeTest) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
// Currently, "asdf" is destined for ShellExecute, so it is allowed to be
// requested but not committed.
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("asdf:rockers")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("asdf:rockers")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("asdf:rockers")));
// Once we register "asdf", we default to deny.
RegisterTestScheme("asdf");
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("asdf:rockers")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("asdf:rockers")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("asdf:rockers")));
// We can allow new schemes by adding them to the whitelist.
p->RegisterWebSafeScheme("asdf");
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("asdf:rockers")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("asdf:rockers")));
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting()) {
// With site-per-process, all URLs (including the one below) will ask to be
// hosted in isolated processes. Since |p| is not locked, CanCommitURL
// should return false.
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("asdf:rockers")));
// After locking the process, CanCommitURL should start returning true.
LockProcessIfNeeded(kRendererID, browser_context(), GURL("asdf:rockers"));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("asdf:rockers")));
} else {
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("asdf:rockers")));
}
// Cleanup.
p->Remove(kRendererID);
p->ClearRegisteredSchemeForTesting("asdf");
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, CanServiceCommandsTest) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
GURL file_url("file:///etc/passwd");
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
LockProcessIfNeeded(kRendererID, browser_context(), file_url);
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("file:///etc/passwd")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("file:///etc/passwd")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("file:///etc/passwd")));
p->GrantCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("file:///etc/passwd"));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("file:///etc/passwd")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("file:///etc/passwd")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("file:///etc/passwd")));
// We should forget our state if we repeat a renderer id.
p->Remove(kRendererID);
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("file:///etc/passwd")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("file:///etc/passwd")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("file:///etc/passwd")));
p->Remove(kRendererID);
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, ViewSource) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
// Child processes cannot request view source URLs.
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID,
GURL("view-source:http://www.google.com/")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID,
GURL("view-source:file:///etc/passwd")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("file:///etc/passwd")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(
kRendererID, GURL("view-source:view-source:http://www.google.com/")));
// Child processes cannot be redirected to view source URLs.
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("view-source:http://www.google.com/")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("view-source:file:///etc/passwd")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("file:///etc/passwd")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRedirectToURL(
GURL("view-source:view-source:http://www.google.com/")));
// View source URLs don't actually commit; the renderer is put into view
// source mode, and the inner URL commits.
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID,
GURL("view-source:http://www.google.com/")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID,
GURL("view-source:file:///etc/passwd")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("file:///etc/passwd")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(
kRendererID, GURL("view-source:view-source:http://www.google.com/")));
p->GrantCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("view-source:file:///etc/passwd"));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("file:///etc/passwd")));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("file:///etc/passwd")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, GURL("file:///etc/passwd")));
EXPECT_FALSE(
p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, GURL("view-source:file:///etc/passwd")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRedirectToURL(GURL("view-source:file:///etc/passwd")));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID,
GURL("view-source:file:///etc/passwd")));
p->Remove(kRendererID);
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, GoogleChromeScheme) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
GURL test_url("googlechrome://whatever");
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, test_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRedirectToURL(test_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, test_url));
p->Remove(kRendererID);
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, GrantCommitURLToNonStandardScheme) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
const GURL url("httpxml://awesome");
const GURL url2("httpxml://also-awesome");
ASSERT_TRUE(url::Origin::Create(url).opaque());
ASSERT_TRUE(url::Origin::Create(url2).opaque());
RegisterTestScheme("httpxml");
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
LockProcessIfNeeded(kRendererID, browser_context(), url);
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url2));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url2));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url2));
// GrantCommitURL with a non-standard scheme should grant commit access to the
// entire scheme.
p->GrantCommitURL(kRendererID, url);
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url2));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url2));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url2));
p->Remove(kRendererID);
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, SpecificFile) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
GURL icon_url("file:///tmp/foo.png");
base::FilePath icon_path;
ASSERT_TRUE(net::FileURLToFilePath(icon_url, &icon_path));
GURL sensitive_url("file:///etc/passwd");
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
LockProcessIfNeeded(kRendererID, browser_context(), sensitive_url);
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, icon_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, sensitive_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(icon_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(sensitive_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, icon_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, sensitive_url));
p->GrantRequestOfSpecificFile(kRendererID, icon_path);
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, icon_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, sensitive_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(icon_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(sensitive_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, icon_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, sensitive_url));
p->GrantCommitURL(kRendererID, icon_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, icon_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, sensitive_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(icon_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(sensitive_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, icon_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, sensitive_url));
p->Remove(kRendererID);
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, ContentUri) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
GURL content_uri("content://authority/foo.png");
GURL content_uri_sensitive("content://authority/bar.jpg");
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
LockProcessIfNeeded(kRendererID, browser_context(), content_uri_sensitive);
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_ANDROID)
// Since android handles content:// URLs, CanRequestURL() is false for a URL
// which was not registered with GrantRequestOfSpecificFile().
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, content_uri));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, content_uri_sensitive));
#else
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, content_uri));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, content_uri_sensitive));
#endif
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(content_uri));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(content_uri_sensitive));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, content_uri));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, content_uri_sensitive));
p->GrantRequestOfSpecificFile(
kRendererID,
base::FilePath::FromUTF8Unsafe(content_uri.possibly_invalid_spec()));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, content_uri));
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_ANDROID)
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, content_uri_sensitive));
#else
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, content_uri_sensitive));
#endif
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(content_uri));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(content_uri_sensitive));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, content_uri));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, content_uri_sensitive));
p->GrantCommitURL(kRendererID, content_uri);
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, content_uri));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, content_uri_sensitive));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(content_uri));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(content_uri_sensitive));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, content_uri));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, content_uri_sensitive));
p->Remove(kRendererID);
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, FileSystemGrantsTest) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
std::string read_id =
storage::IsolatedContext::GetInstance()->RegisterFileSystemForVirtualPath(
storage::kFileSystemTypeTest, "read_filesystem", base::FilePath());
std::string read_write_id =
storage::IsolatedContext::GetInstance()->RegisterFileSystemForVirtualPath(
storage::kFileSystemTypeTest,
"read_write_filesystem",
base::FilePath());
std::string copy_into_id =
storage::IsolatedContext::GetInstance()->RegisterFileSystemForVirtualPath(
storage::kFileSystemTypeTest,
"copy_into_filesystem",
base::FilePath());
std::string delete_from_id =
storage::IsolatedContext::GetInstance()->RegisterFileSystemForVirtualPath(
storage::kFileSystemTypeTest,
"delete_from_filesystem",
base::FilePath());
// Test initially having no permissions.
CheckHasNoFileSystemPermission(p, read_id);
CheckHasNoFileSystemPermission(p, read_write_id);
CheckHasNoFileSystemPermission(p, copy_into_id);
CheckHasNoFileSystemPermission(p, delete_from_id);
// Testing varying combinations of grants and checks.
p->GrantReadFileSystem(kRendererID, read_id);
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanReadFileSystem(kRendererID, read_id));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanReadWriteFileSystem(kRendererID, read_id));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCopyIntoFileSystem(kRendererID, read_id));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanDeleteFromFileSystem(kRendererID, read_id));
p->GrantReadFileSystem(kRendererID, read_write_id);
p->GrantWriteFileSystem(kRendererID, read_write_id);
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanReadFileSystem(kRendererID, read_write_id));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanReadWriteFileSystem(kRendererID, read_write_id));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCopyIntoFileSystem(kRendererID, read_write_id));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanDeleteFromFileSystem(kRendererID, read_write_id));
p->GrantCopyIntoFileSystem(kRendererID, copy_into_id);
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanReadFileSystem(kRendererID, copy_into_id));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanReadWriteFileSystem(kRendererID, copy_into_id));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCopyIntoFileSystem(kRendererID, copy_into_id));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanDeleteFromFileSystem(kRendererID, copy_into_id));
p->GrantDeleteFromFileSystem(kRendererID, delete_from_id);
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanReadFileSystem(kRendererID, delete_from_id));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanReadWriteFileSystem(kRendererID, delete_from_id));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCopyIntoFileSystem(kRendererID, delete_from_id));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanDeleteFromFileSystem(kRendererID, delete_from_id));
// Test revoke permissions on renderer ID removal.
p->Remove(kRendererID);
CheckHasNoFileSystemPermission(p, read_id);
CheckHasNoFileSystemPermission(p, read_write_id);
CheckHasNoFileSystemPermission(p, copy_into_id);
CheckHasNoFileSystemPermission(p, delete_from_id);
// Test having no permissions upon re-adding same renderer ID.
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
CheckHasNoFileSystemPermission(p, read_id);
CheckHasNoFileSystemPermission(p, read_write_id);
CheckHasNoFileSystemPermission(p, copy_into_id);
CheckHasNoFileSystemPermission(p, delete_from_id);
// Cleanup.
p->Remove(kRendererID);
storage::IsolatedContext::GetInstance()->RevokeFileSystem(read_id);
storage::IsolatedContext::GetInstance()->RevokeFileSystem(read_write_id);
storage::IsolatedContext::GetInstance()->RevokeFileSystem(copy_into_id);
storage::IsolatedContext::GetInstance()->RevokeFileSystem(delete_from_id);
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, FilePermissionGrantingAndRevoking) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
p->RegisterFileSystemPermissionPolicy(
storage::kFileSystemTypeTest,
storage::FILE_PERMISSION_USE_FILE_PERMISSION);
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
LockProcessIfNeeded(kRendererID, browser_context(), GURL("http://foo/"));
base::FilePath file(TEST_PATH("/dir/testfile"));
file = file.NormalizePathSeparators();
storage::FileSystemURL url = storage::FileSystemURL::CreateForTest(
blink::StorageKey::CreateFromStringForTesting("http://foo/"),
storage::kFileSystemTypeTest, file);
// Test initially having no permissions.
CheckHasNoFileSystemFilePermission(p, file, url);
// Testing every combination of permissions granting and revoking.
p->GrantReadFile(kRendererID, file);
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanReadFile(kRendererID, file));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCreateReadWriteFile(kRendererID, file));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanReadFileSystemFile(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanWriteFileSystemFile(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCreateFileSystemFile(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCreateReadWriteFileSystemFile(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCopyIntoFileSystemFile(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanDeleteFileSystemFile(kRendererID, url));
p->RevokeAllPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, file);
CheckHasNoFileSystemFilePermission(p, file, url);
p->GrantCreateReadWriteFile(kRendererID, file);
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanReadFile(kRendererID, file));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCreateReadWriteFile(kRendererID, file));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanReadFileSystemFile(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanWriteFileSystemFile(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCreateFileSystemFile(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCreateReadWriteFileSystemFile(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCopyIntoFileSystemFile(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanDeleteFileSystemFile(kRendererID, url));
p->RevokeAllPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, file);
CheckHasNoFileSystemFilePermission(p, file, url);
// Test revoke permissions on renderer ID removal.
p->GrantCreateReadWriteFile(kRendererID, file);
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanReadFile(kRendererID, file));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCreateReadWriteFile(kRendererID, file));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanReadFileSystemFile(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanWriteFileSystemFile(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCreateFileSystemFile(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCreateReadWriteFileSystemFile(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCopyIntoFileSystemFile(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanDeleteFileSystemFile(kRendererID, url));
p->Remove(kRendererID);
CheckHasNoFileSystemFilePermission(p, file, url);
// Test having no permissions upon re-adding same renderer ID.
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
CheckHasNoFileSystemFilePermission(p, file, url);
LockProcessIfNeeded(kRendererID, browser_context(), GURL("http://foo/"));
CheckHasNoFileSystemFilePermission(p, file, url);
// Cleanup.
p->Remove(kRendererID);
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, FilePermissions) {
base::FilePath granted_file = base::FilePath(TEST_PATH("/home/joe"));
base::FilePath sibling_file = base::FilePath(TEST_PATH("/home/bob"));
base::FilePath child_file = base::FilePath(TEST_PATH("/home/joe/file"));
base::FilePath parent_file = base::FilePath(TEST_PATH("/home"));
base::FilePath parent_slash_file = base::FilePath(TEST_PATH("/home/"));
base::FilePath child_traversal1 =
base::FilePath(TEST_PATH("/home/joe/././file"));
base::FilePath child_traversal2 = base::FilePath(
TEST_PATH("/home/joe/file/../otherfile"));
base::FilePath evil_traversal1 =
base::FilePath(TEST_PATH("/home/joe/../../etc/passwd"));
base::FilePath evil_traversal2 = base::FilePath(
TEST_PATH("/home/joe/./.././../etc/passwd"));
base::FilePath self_traversal =
base::FilePath(TEST_PATH("/home/joe/../joe/file"));
base::FilePath relative_file = base::FilePath(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("home/joe"));
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
// Grant permissions for a file.
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
EXPECT_FALSE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, granted_file,
base::File::FLAG_OPEN));
GrantPermissionsForFile(p, kRendererID, granted_file,
base::File::FLAG_OPEN |
base::File::FLAG_OPEN_TRUNCATED |
base::File::FLAG_READ |
base::File::FLAG_WRITE);
EXPECT_TRUE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, granted_file,
base::File::FLAG_OPEN |
base::File::FLAG_OPEN_TRUNCATED |
base::File::FLAG_READ |
base::File::FLAG_WRITE));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, granted_file,
base::File::FLAG_OPEN |
base::File::FLAG_READ));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, granted_file,
base::File::FLAG_CREATE));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, granted_file, 0));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, granted_file,
base::File::FLAG_CREATE |
base::File::FLAG_OPEN_TRUNCATED |
base::File::FLAG_READ |
base::File::FLAG_WRITE));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, sibling_file,
base::File::FLAG_OPEN |
base::File::FLAG_READ));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, parent_file,
base::File::FLAG_OPEN |
base::File::FLAG_READ));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, child_file,
base::File::FLAG_OPEN |
base::File::FLAG_READ));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, child_traversal1,
base::File::FLAG_OPEN |
base::File::FLAG_READ));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, child_traversal2,
base::File::FLAG_OPEN |
base::File::FLAG_READ));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, evil_traversal1,
base::File::FLAG_OPEN |
base::File::FLAG_READ));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, evil_traversal2,
base::File::FLAG_OPEN |
base::File::FLAG_READ));
// CPSP doesn't allow this case for the sake of simplicity.
EXPECT_FALSE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, self_traversal,
base::File::FLAG_OPEN |
base::File::FLAG_READ));
p->Remove(kRendererID);
// Grant permissions for the directory the file is in.
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
EXPECT_FALSE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, granted_file,
base::File::FLAG_OPEN));
GrantPermissionsForFile(p, kRendererID, parent_file,
base::File::FLAG_OPEN |
base::File::FLAG_READ);
EXPECT_TRUE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, granted_file,
base::File::FLAG_OPEN));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, granted_file,
base::File::FLAG_READ |
base::File::FLAG_WRITE));
p->Remove(kRendererID);
// Grant permissions for the directory the file is in (with trailing '/').
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
EXPECT_FALSE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, granted_file,
base::File::FLAG_OPEN));
GrantPermissionsForFile(p, kRendererID, parent_slash_file,
base::File::FLAG_OPEN |
base::File::FLAG_READ);
EXPECT_TRUE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, granted_file,
base::File::FLAG_OPEN));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, granted_file,
base::File::FLAG_READ |
base::File::FLAG_WRITE));
// Grant permissions for the file (should overwrite the permissions granted
// for the directory).
GrantPermissionsForFile(p, kRendererID, granted_file,
base::File::FLAG_WIN_TEMPORARY);
EXPECT_FALSE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, granted_file,
base::File::FLAG_OPEN));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, granted_file,
base::File::FLAG_WIN_TEMPORARY));
// Revoke all permissions for the file (it should inherit its permissions
// from the directory again).
p->RevokeAllPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, granted_file);
EXPECT_TRUE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, granted_file,
base::File::FLAG_OPEN |
base::File::FLAG_READ));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, granted_file,
base::File::FLAG_WIN_TEMPORARY));
p->Remove(kRendererID);
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
GrantPermissionsForFile(p, kRendererID, relative_file,
base::File::FLAG_OPEN);
EXPECT_FALSE(p->HasPermissionsForFile(kRendererID, relative_file,
base::File::FLAG_OPEN));
p->Remove(kRendererID);
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, CanServiceWebUIBindings) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
const GURL url(GetWebUIURL("thumb/http://www.google.com/"));
const GURL other_url(GetWebUIURL("not-thumb/"));
const url::Origin origin = url::Origin::Create(url);
{
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
LockProcessIfNeeded(kRendererID, browser_context(), url);
EXPECT_FALSE(p->HasWebUIBindings(kRendererID));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, other_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, other_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(other_url));
p->GrantWebUIBindings(kRendererID,
BindingsPolicySet({BindingsPolicyValue::kWebUi}));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->HasWebUIBindings(kRendererID));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, other_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, other_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(other_url));
p->GrantCommitOrigin(kRendererID, origin);
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, other_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, other_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(other_url));
p->Remove(kRendererID);
}
{
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
LockProcessIfNeeded(kRendererID, browser_context(), url);
EXPECT_FALSE(p->HasWebUIBindings(kRendererID));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, other_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, other_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(other_url));
p->GrantWebUIBindings(kRendererID,
BindingsPolicySet({BindingsPolicyValue::kMojoWebUi}));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->HasWebUIBindings(kRendererID));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, other_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, other_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(other_url));
p->GrantCommitOrigin(kRendererID, origin);
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, other_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, other_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(other_url));
p->Remove(kRendererID);
}
{
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
LockProcessIfNeeded(kRendererID, browser_context(), url);
EXPECT_FALSE(p->HasWebUIBindings(kRendererID));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, other_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, other_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(other_url));
p->GrantWebUIBindings(kRendererID, kWebUIBindingsPolicySet);
EXPECT_TRUE(p->HasWebUIBindings(kRendererID));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, other_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, other_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(other_url));
p->GrantCommitOrigin(kRendererID, origin);
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, other_url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, other_url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(other_url));
p->Remove(kRendererID);
}
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, RemoveRace) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
GURL url("file:///etc/passwd");
base::FilePath file(TEST_PATH("/etc/passwd"));
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
p->GrantCommitURL(kRendererID, url);
p->GrantReadFile(kRendererID, file);
p->GrantWebUIBindings(kRendererID, kWebUIBindingsPolicySet);
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanReadFile(kRendererID, file));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->HasWebUIBindings(kRendererID));
p->Remove(kRendererID);
// Renderers are added and removed on the UI thread, but the policy can be
// queried on the IO thread. The ChildProcessSecurityPolicy needs to be
// prepared to answer policy questions about renderers who no longer exist.
// In this case, we default to secure behavior.
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanReadFile(kRendererID, file));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->HasWebUIBindings(kRendererID));
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, HandleDuplicate) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
GURL url("file:///etc/passwd");
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
LockProcessIfNeeded(kRendererID, browser_context(), url);
auto handle = p->CreateHandle(kRendererID);
EXPECT_TRUE(handle.CanAccessDataForOrigin(url::Origin::Create(url)));
// Verify that a valid duplicate can be created and allows access.
auto duplicate_handle = handle.Duplicate();
EXPECT_TRUE(duplicate_handle.is_valid());
EXPECT_TRUE(
duplicate_handle.CanAccessDataForOrigin(url::Origin::Create(url)));
p->Remove(kRendererID);
// Verify that both handles still work even after Remove() has been called.
EXPECT_TRUE(handle.CanAccessDataForOrigin(url::Origin::Create(url)));
EXPECT_TRUE(
duplicate_handle.CanAccessDataForOrigin(url::Origin::Create(url)));
// Verify that a new duplicate can be created after Remove().
auto duplicate_handle2 = handle.Duplicate();
EXPECT_TRUE(duplicate_handle2.is_valid());
EXPECT_TRUE(
duplicate_handle2.CanAccessDataForOrigin(url::Origin::Create(url)));
// Verify that a new valid Handle cannot be created after Remove().
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CreateHandle(kRendererID).is_valid());
// Invalidate the original Handle and verify that the duplicates still work.
handle = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::Handle();
EXPECT_FALSE(handle.CanAccessDataForOrigin(url::Origin::Create(url)));
EXPECT_TRUE(
duplicate_handle.CanAccessDataForOrigin(url::Origin::Create(url)));
EXPECT_TRUE(
duplicate_handle2.CanAccessDataForOrigin(url::Origin::Create(url)));
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, CanAccessDataForOrigin_URL) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
GURL file_url("file:///etc/passwd");
GURL foo_http_url("http://foo.com/index.html");
GURL foo_blob_url("blob:http://foo.com/43d75119-d7af-4471-a293-07c6b3d7e61a");
GURL foo_filesystem_url("filesystem:http://foo.com/temporary/test.html");
GURL bar_http_url("http://bar.com/index.html");
const std::vector<GURL> kAllTestUrls = {file_url, foo_http_url, foo_blob_url,
foo_filesystem_url, bar_http_url};
// Test invalid ID and invalid Handle cases.
auto handle = p->CreateHandle(kRendererID);
for (auto url : kAllTestUrls) {
EXPECT_FALSE(
p->CanAccessDataForOrigin(kRendererID, url::Origin::Create(url)))
<< url;
EXPECT_FALSE(
handle.CanAccessDataForOrigin(url::Origin::Create(bar_http_url)))
<< url;
}
TestBrowserContext browser_context;
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, &browser_context);
// Replace the old invalid handle with a new valid handle.
handle = p->CreateHandle(kRendererID);
// Verify unlocked origin permissions.
for (auto url : kAllTestUrls) {
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting()) {
// A non-locked process cannot access URLs below (because with
// site-per-process all the URLs need to be isolated).
EXPECT_FALSE(
p->CanAccessDataForOrigin(kRendererID, url::Origin::Create(url)))
<< url;
EXPECT_FALSE(handle.CanAccessDataForOrigin(url::Origin::Create(url)))
<< url;
} else {
EXPECT_TRUE(
p->CanAccessDataForOrigin(kRendererID, url::Origin::Create(url)))
<< url;
EXPECT_TRUE(handle.CanAccessDataForOrigin(url::Origin::Create(url)))
<< url;
}
}
// Isolate |http_url| so we can't get a default SiteInstance.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({url::Origin::Create(foo_http_url)},
IsolatedOriginSource::TEST, &browser_context);
// Lock process to |http_url| origin.
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> foo_instance =
SiteInstanceImpl::CreateForTesting(&browser_context, foo_http_url);
EXPECT_FALSE(foo_instance->IsDefaultSiteInstance());
LockProcessIfNeeded(kRendererID, &browser_context, foo_http_url);
// Verify that file access is no longer allowed.
EXPECT_FALSE(
p->CanAccessDataForOrigin(kRendererID, url::Origin::Create(file_url)));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanAccessDataForOrigin(kRendererID,
url::Origin::Create(foo_http_url)));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanAccessDataForOrigin(kRendererID,
url::Origin::Create(foo_blob_url)));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanAccessDataForOrigin(
kRendererID, url::Origin::Create(foo_filesystem_url)));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanAccessDataForOrigin(kRendererID,
url::Origin::Create(bar_http_url)));
EXPECT_FALSE(handle.CanAccessDataForOrigin(url::Origin::Create(file_url)));
EXPECT_TRUE(handle.CanAccessDataForOrigin(url::Origin::Create(foo_http_url)));
EXPECT_TRUE(handle.CanAccessDataForOrigin(url::Origin::Create(foo_blob_url)));
EXPECT_TRUE(
handle.CanAccessDataForOrigin(url::Origin::Create(foo_filesystem_url)));
EXPECT_FALSE(
handle.CanAccessDataForOrigin(url::Origin::Create(bar_http_url)));
// Invalidate handle so it does not preserve security state beyond Remove().
handle = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::Handle();
p->Remove(kRendererID);
// Post a task to the IO loop that then posts a task to the UI loop.
// This should cause the |run_loop| to return after the removal has completed.
base::RunLoop run_loop;
GetIOThreadTaskRunner({})->PostTaskAndReply(FROM_HERE, base::DoNothing(),
run_loop.QuitClosure());
run_loop.Run();
// Verify invalid ID is rejected now that Remove() has completed.
for (auto url : kAllTestUrls) {
EXPECT_FALSE(
p->CanAccessDataForOrigin(kRendererID, url::Origin::Create(url)))
<< url;
EXPECT_FALSE(handle.CanAccessDataForOrigin(url::Origin::Create(url)))
<< url;
}
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, CanAccessDataForOrigin_Origin) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
const std::vector<const char*> foo_urls = {
"http://foo.com/index.html",
"blob:http://foo.com/43d75119-d7af-4471-a293-07c6b3d7e61a",
"filesystem:http://foo.com/temporary/test.html",
// Port differences considered equal.
"http://foo.com:1234/index.html",
"blob:http://foo.com:1234/43d75119-d7af-4471-a293-07c6b3d7e61a",
"filesystem:http://foo.com:1234/temporary/test.html",
// TODO(acolwell): data: should be in |non_foo_urls| in the long-term.
"data:text/html,Hello!"};
const std::vector<const char*> non_foo_urls = {
"file:///etc/passwd",
"http://bar.com/index.html",
"blob:http://bar.com/43d75119-d7af-4471-a293-07c6b3d7e61a",
"filesystem:http://bar.com/temporary/test.html",
// foo.com with a different scheme not considered equal.
"https://foo.com/index.html",
"blob:https://foo.com/43d75119-d7af-4471-a293-07c6b3d7e61a",
"filesystem:https://foo.com/temporary/test.html"};
std::vector<url::Origin> foo_origins;
std::vector<url::Origin> non_foo_origins;
std::vector<url::Origin> all_origins;
for (auto* url : foo_urls) {
auto origin = url::Origin::Create(GURL(url));
foo_origins.push_back(origin);
all_origins.push_back(origin);
}
auto foo_origin = url::Origin::Create(GURL("http://foo.com"));
auto opaque_with_foo_precursor = foo_origin.DeriveNewOpaqueOrigin();
foo_origins.push_back(opaque_with_foo_precursor);
all_origins.push_back(opaque_with_foo_precursor);
for (auto* url : non_foo_urls) {
auto origin = url::Origin::Create(GURL(url));
non_foo_origins.push_back(origin);
all_origins.push_back(origin);
}
url::Origin opaque_origin_without_precursor;
// TODO(acolwell): This should be in |non_foo_origins| in the long-term.
foo_origins.push_back(opaque_origin_without_precursor);
all_origins.push_back(opaque_origin_without_precursor);
auto opaque_with_bar_precursor =
url::Origin::Create(GURL("http://bar.com")).DeriveNewOpaqueOrigin();
non_foo_origins.push_back(opaque_with_bar_precursor);
all_origins.push_back(opaque_with_bar_precursor);
// Test invalid process ID for all cases.
for (const auto& origin : all_origins)
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanAccessDataForOrigin(kRendererID, origin)) << origin;
TestBrowserContext browser_context;
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, &browser_context);
// Verify unlocked process permissions.
for (const auto& origin : all_origins) {
if (AreAllSitesIsolatedForTesting()) {
if (origin.opaque() &&
!origin.GetTupleOrPrecursorTupleIfOpaque().IsValid()) {
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanAccessDataForOrigin(kRendererID, origin)) << origin;
} else {
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanAccessDataForOrigin(kRendererID, origin)) << origin;
}
} else {
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanAccessDataForOrigin(kRendererID, origin)) << origin;
}
}
// Isolate |foo_origin| so we can't get a default SiteInstance.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({foo_origin}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST,
&browser_context);
// Lock process to |foo_origin| origin.
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> foo_instance =
SiteInstanceImpl::CreateForTesting(&browser_context, foo_origin.GetURL());
EXPECT_FALSE(foo_instance->IsDefaultSiteInstance());
LockProcessIfNeeded(kRendererID, &browser_context, foo_origin.GetURL());
// Verify that access is no longer allowed for origins that are not associated
// with foo.com.
for (const auto& origin : foo_origins)
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanAccessDataForOrigin(kRendererID, origin)) << origin;
for (const auto& origin : non_foo_origins)
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanAccessDataForOrigin(kRendererID, origin)) << origin;
p->Remove(kRendererID);
// Post a task to the IO loop that then posts a task to the UI loop.
// This should cause the |run_loop| to return after the removal has completed.
base::RunLoop run_loop;
GetIOThreadTaskRunner({})->PostTaskAndReply(FROM_HERE, base::DoNothing(),
run_loop.QuitClosure());
run_loop.Run();
// Verify invalid ID is rejected now that Remove() has completed.
for (const auto& origin : all_origins)
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanAccessDataForOrigin(kRendererID, origin)) << origin;
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, SandboxedProcessEnforcements) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
TestBrowserContext browser_context;
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, &browser_context);
// Create a ProcessLock for a process-isolated sandboxed frame, and lock the
// kRendererID process to it.
UrlInfo sandboxed_url_info(
UrlInfoInit(GURL("https://foo.com")).WithSandbox(true));
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> sandboxed_instance =
SiteInstanceImpl::CreateForUrlInfo(&browser_context, sandboxed_url_info,
/*is_guest=*/false,
/*is_fenced=*/false,
/*is_fixed_storage_partition=*/false);
p->LockProcess(sandboxed_instance->GetIsolationContext(), kRendererID,
/*is_process_used=*/false,
ProcessLock::FromSiteInfo(sandboxed_instance->GetSiteInfo()));
auto foo_origin = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://foo.com"));
auto opaque_foo_origin = foo_origin.DeriveNewOpaqueOrigin();
auto bar_origin = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://bar.com"));
auto opaque_bar_origin = bar_origin.DeriveNewOpaqueOrigin();
using AccessType = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::AccessType;
// A sandboxed process should be able to commit new URLs, as long as they
// have an opaque origin with a matching precursor.
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanAccessOrigin(kRendererID, opaque_foo_origin,
AccessType::kCanCommitNewOrigin));
// TODO(crbug.com/325410297): Currently, non-opaque origins are allowed to
// commit. Fix this and flip the expectation to false.
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanAccessOrigin(kRendererID, foo_origin,
AccessType::kCanCommitNewOrigin));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanAccessOrigin(kRendererID, bar_origin,
AccessType::kCanCommitNewOrigin));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanAccessOrigin(kRendererID, opaque_bar_origin,
AccessType::kCanCommitNewOrigin));
// A sandboxed process should not be able to access data for any origin.
EXPECT_FALSE(
p->CanAccessOrigin(kRendererID, opaque_foo_origin,
AccessType::kCanAccessDataForCommittedOrigin));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanAccessOrigin(
kRendererID, foo_origin, AccessType::kCanAccessDataForCommittedOrigin));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanAccessOrigin(
kRendererID, bar_origin, AccessType::kCanAccessDataForCommittedOrigin));
EXPECT_FALSE(
p->CanAccessOrigin(kRendererID, opaque_bar_origin,
AccessType::kCanAccessDataForCommittedOrigin));
// A sandboxed process should only be able to claim that it has an opaque
// origin.
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanAccessOrigin(kRendererID, opaque_foo_origin,
AccessType::kHostsOrigin));
EXPECT_FALSE(
p->CanAccessOrigin(kRendererID, foo_origin, AccessType::kHostsOrigin));
EXPECT_FALSE(
p->CanAccessOrigin(kRendererID, bar_origin, AccessType::kHostsOrigin));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanAccessOrigin(kRendererID, opaque_bar_origin,
AccessType::kHostsOrigin));
p->Remove(kRendererID);
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, PdfProcessEnforcements) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
TestBrowserContext browser_context;
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, &browser_context);
// Create a ProcessLock for a PDF renderer, and lock the kRendererID process
// to it.
UrlInfo pdf_url_info(UrlInfoInit(GURL("https://foo.com")).WithIsPdf(true));
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> pdf_instance =
SiteInstanceImpl::CreateForUrlInfo(&browser_context, pdf_url_info,
/*is_guest=*/false,
/*is_fenced=*/false,
/*is_fixed_storage_partition=*/false);
p->LockProcess(pdf_instance->GetIsolationContext(), kRendererID,
/*is_process_used=*/false,
ProcessLock::FromSiteInfo(pdf_instance->GetSiteInfo()));
auto foo_origin = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://foo.com"));
auto bar_origin = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://bar.com"));
using AccessType = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::AccessType;
// A PDF process should be able to commit new URLs that match its ProcessLock.
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanAccessOrigin(kRendererID, foo_origin,
AccessType::kCanCommitNewOrigin));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanAccessOrigin(kRendererID, bar_origin,
AccessType::kCanCommitNewOrigin));
// A PDF process should also be able to claim it's hosting an origin that
// matches its ProcessLock; for example, PDF documents can still use
// postMessage so they need to use this to validate the source origin.
EXPECT_TRUE(
p->CanAccessOrigin(kRendererID, foo_origin, AccessType::kHostsOrigin));
EXPECT_FALSE(
p->CanAccessOrigin(kRendererID, bar_origin, AccessType::kHostsOrigin));
// A PDF process should not be able to access data for any origin.
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanAccessOrigin(
kRendererID, foo_origin, AccessType::kCanAccessDataForCommittedOrigin));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanAccessOrigin(
kRendererID, bar_origin, AccessType::kCanAccessDataForCommittedOrigin));
p->Remove(kRendererID);
}
// Test the granting of origin permissions, and their interactions with
// granting scheme permissions.
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, OriginGranting) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
GURL url_foo1(GetWebUIURL("foo/resource1"));
GURL url_foo2(GetWebUIURL("foo/resource2"));
GURL url_bar(GetWebUIURL("bar/resource3"));
p->AddForTesting(kRendererID, browser_context());
LockProcessIfNeeded(kRendererID, browser_context(), url_foo1);
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url_foo1));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url_foo2));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url_bar));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url_foo1));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url_foo2));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url_bar));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url_foo1));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url_foo2));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url_bar));
p->GrantRequestOrigin(kRendererID, url::Origin::Create(url_foo1));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url_foo1));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url_foo2));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url_bar));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url_foo1));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url_foo2));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url_bar));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url_foo1));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url_foo2));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url_bar));
p->GrantCommitOrigin(kRendererID, url::Origin::Create(url_foo1));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url_foo1));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url_foo2));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url_bar));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url_foo1));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url_foo2));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url_bar));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url_foo1));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url_foo2));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url_bar));
// Make sure this doesn't overwrite the earlier commit grants.
p->GrantRequestOrigin(kRendererID, url::Origin::Create(url_foo1));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url_foo1));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url_foo2));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanRequestURL(kRendererID, url_bar));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url_foo1));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url_foo2));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanRedirectToURL(url_bar));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url_foo1));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url_foo2));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanCommitURL(kRendererID, url_bar));
p->Remove(kRendererID);
}
#define LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(lock, value, matcher) \
do { \
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock); \
EXPECT_THAT(value, matcher); \
} while (0);
// Verifies ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::AddFutureIsolatedOrigins method.
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, AddFutureIsolatedOrigins) {
url::Origin foo = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://foo.com/"));
url::Origin bar = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://bar.com/"));
url::Origin baz = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://baz.com/"));
url::Origin quxfoo = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://qux.foo.com/"));
url::Origin baz_http = url::Origin::Create(GURL("http://baz.com/"));
url::Origin baz_http_8000 = url::Origin::Create(GURL("http://baz.com:8000/"));
url::Origin baz_https_8000 =
url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://baz.com:8000/"));
url::Origin invalid_etld = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://gov/"));
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
// Initially there should be no isolated origins.
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::IsEmpty());
// Verify deduplication of the argument.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({foo, bar, bar}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(
p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(GetIsolatedOriginEntry(foo),
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(bar)));
// Verify that the old set is extended (not replaced).
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({baz}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(
p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(GetIsolatedOriginEntry(foo),
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(bar),
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(baz)));
// Verify deduplication against the old set.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({foo}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(
p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(GetIsolatedOriginEntry(foo),
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(bar),
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(baz)));
// Verify deduplication considers scheme and port differences. Note that
// origins that differ only in ports map to the same key.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({baz, baz_http_8000, baz_https_8000},
IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(
p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(foo), GetIsolatedOriginEntry(bar),
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(baz), GetIsolatedOriginEntry(baz_http)));
// Verify that adding an origin that is invalid for isolation will 1) log a
// warning and 2) won't CHECK or crash the browser process, 3) will not add
// the invalid origin, but will add the remaining origins passed to
// AddFutureIsolatedOrigins. Note that the new |quxfoo| origin should map to
// the same key (i.e., the https://foo.com/ site URL) as the existing |foo|
// origin.
{
base::test::MockLog mock_log;
EXPECT_CALL(mock_log,
Log(::logging::LOGGING_ERROR, testing::_, testing::_,
testing::_, testing::HasSubstr(invalid_etld.Serialize())))
.Times(1);
mock_log.StartCapturingLogs();
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({quxfoo, invalid_etld},
IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(
p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(foo, quxfoo), GetIsolatedOriginEntry(bar),
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(baz), GetIsolatedOriginEntry(baz_http)));
}
// Verify that adding invalid origins via the string variant of
// AddFutureIsolatedOrigins() logs a warning.
{
base::test::MockLog mock_log;
EXPECT_CALL(mock_log, Log(::logging::LOGGING_ERROR, testing::_, testing::_,
testing::_, testing::HasSubstr("about:blank")))
.Times(1);
mock_log.StartCapturingLogs();
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins("about:blank", IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
}
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(foo);
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(quxfoo);
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(bar);
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(baz);
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(baz_http);
// We should have removed all isolated origins at this point.
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::IsEmpty());
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, IsolateAllSuborigins) {
url::Origin qux = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://qux.com/"));
IsolatedOriginPattern etld1_wild("https://[*.]foo.com");
IsolatedOriginPattern etld2_wild("https://[*.]bar.foo.com");
url::Origin etld1 = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://foo.com"));
url::Origin etld2 = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://bar.foo.com"));
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
// Check we can add a single wildcard origin.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({etld1_wild}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(
p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(GetIsolatedOriginEntry(etld1, true)));
// Add a conventional origin and check they can live side by side.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({qux}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(
p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(GetIsolatedOriginEntry(etld1, true),
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(qux, false)));
// Check that a wildcard domain within another wildcard domain can be added.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({etld2_wild}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(etld1, etld2, true, true),
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(qux, false)));
// Check that removing a single wildcard domain, that contains another
// wildcard domain, doesn't affect the isolating behavior of the original
// wildcard domain.
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(etld1);
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(
p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(GetIsolatedOriginEntry(etld2, true),
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(qux, false)));
// Removing remaining domains.
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(qux);
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(etld2);
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::IsEmpty());
}
// Verify that the isolation behavior for wildcard and non-wildcard origins,
// singly or in concert, behaves correctly via calls to GetSiteForURL().
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest_NoOriginKeyedProcessesByDefault,
WildcardAndNonWildcardOrigins) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
// There should be no isolated origins before this test starts.
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::IsEmpty());
// Construct a simple case, a single isolated origin.
// IsolatedOriginPattern isolated("https://isolated.com");
IsolatedOriginPattern inner_isolated("https://inner.isolated.com");
IsolatedOriginPattern wildcard("https://[*.]wildcard.com");
IsolatedOriginPattern inner_wildcard("https://[*.]inner.wildcard.com");
GURL isolated_url("https://isolated.com");
GURL inner_isolated_url("https://inner.isolated.com");
GURL host_inner_isolated_url("https://host.inner.isolated.com");
GURL wildcard_url("https://wildcard.com");
GURL inner_wildcard_url("https://inner.wildcard.com");
GURL host_inner_wildcard_url("https://host.inner.wildcard.com");
GURL unrelated_url("https://unrelated.com");
// Verify the isolation behavior of the test patterns before isolating any
// domains.
std::map<GURL, GURL> origins_site_test_map{
{isolated_url, isolated_url},
{inner_isolated_url, isolated_url},
{host_inner_isolated_url, isolated_url},
{wildcard_url, wildcard_url},
{inner_wildcard_url, wildcard_url},
{host_inner_wildcard_url, wildcard_url},
{unrelated_url, unrelated_url},
};
CheckGetSiteForURL(browser_context(), origins_site_test_map);
// Add |wildcard|, a wildcard origin from a different domain, then verify that
// the existing behavior of |isolated_url| and |inner_isolated_url| remains
// unaffected, while all subdomains of wildcard.com are returned as unique
// sites.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({wildcard}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
origins_site_test_map[inner_wildcard_url] = inner_wildcard_url;
origins_site_test_map[host_inner_wildcard_url] = host_inner_wildcard_url;
CheckGetSiteForURL(browser_context(), origins_site_test_map);
// Add |inner_isolated|, then verify that querying for |inner_isolated_url|
// returns |inner_isolated_url| while leaving the wildcard origins unaffected.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({inner_isolated}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
origins_site_test_map[inner_isolated_url] = inner_isolated_url;
origins_site_test_map[host_inner_isolated_url] = inner_isolated_url;
CheckGetSiteForURL(browser_context(), origins_site_test_map);
// Add |inner_wildcard|. This should not change the behavior of the test
// above as all subdomains of |inner_wildcard| are contained within
// |wildcard|.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({inner_wildcard}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
CheckGetSiteForURL(browser_context(), origins_site_test_map);
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(wildcard.origin());
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(inner_isolated.origin());
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(inner_wildcard.origin());
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::IsEmpty());
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest_NoOriginKeyedProcessesByDefault,
WildcardAndNonWildcardEmbedded) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
// There should be no isolated origins before this test starts.
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::IsEmpty());
{
// Test the behavior of a wildcard origin contained within a single
// isolated origin. Removing the isolated origin should have no effect on
// the wildcard origin.
IsolatedOriginPattern isolated("https://isolated.com");
IsolatedOriginPattern wildcard_isolated(
"https://[*.]wildcard.isolated.com");
GURL isolated_url("https://isolated.com");
GURL a_isolated_url("https://a.isolated.com");
GURL wildcard_isolated_url("https://wildcard.isolated.com");
GURL a_wildcard_isolated_url("https://a.wildcard.isolated.com");
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({isolated, wildcard_isolated},
IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
std::map<GURL, GURL> origin_site_map{
{isolated_url, isolated_url},
{a_isolated_url, isolated_url},
{wildcard_isolated_url, wildcard_isolated_url},
{a_wildcard_isolated_url, a_wildcard_isolated_url},
};
CheckGetSiteForURL(browser_context(), origin_site_map);
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(isolated.origin());
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(wildcard_isolated.origin());
}
// No isolated origins should persist between tests.
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::IsEmpty());
{
// A single isolated origin is nested within a wildcard origin. In this
// scenario the wildcard origin supersedes isolated origins.
IsolatedOriginPattern wildcard("https://[*.]wildcard.com");
IsolatedOriginPattern isolated_wildcard("https://isolated.wildcard.com");
GURL wildcard_url("https://wildcard.com");
GURL a_wildcard_url("https://a.wildcard.com");
GURL isolated_wildcard_url("https://isolated.wildcard.com");
GURL a_isolated_wildcard_url("https://a.isolated.wildcard.com");
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({wildcard, isolated_wildcard},
IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
std::map<GURL, GURL> origin_site_map{
{wildcard_url, wildcard_url},
{a_wildcard_url, a_wildcard_url},
{isolated_wildcard_url, isolated_wildcard_url},
{a_isolated_wildcard_url, a_isolated_wildcard_url},
};
CheckGetSiteForURL(browser_context(), origin_site_map);
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(wildcard.origin());
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(isolated_wildcard.origin());
}
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::IsEmpty());
{
// Nest wildcard isolated origins within each other. Verify that removing
// the outer wildcard origin doesn't affect the inner one.
IsolatedOriginPattern outer("https://[*.]outer.com");
IsolatedOriginPattern inner("https://[*.]inner.outer.com");
GURL outer_url("https://outer.com");
GURL a_outer_url("https://a.outer.com");
GURL inner_url("https://inner.outer.com");
GURL a_inner_url("https://a.inner.outer.com");
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({inner, outer}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
std::map<GURL, GURL> origin_site_map{
{outer_url, outer_url},
{a_outer_url, a_outer_url},
{inner_url, inner_url},
{a_inner_url, a_inner_url},
};
CheckGetSiteForURL(browser_context(), origin_site_map);
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(outer.origin());
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(inner.origin());
}
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::IsEmpty());
// Verify that adding a wildcard domain then a then a conventional domain
// doesn't affect the isolating behavior of the wildcard, i.e. whichever
// isolated domain is added entered 'wins'.
{
IsolatedOriginPattern wild("https://[*.]bar.foo.com");
IsolatedOriginPattern single("https://bar.foo.com");
GURL host_url("https://host.bar.foo.com");
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({wild}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
std::map<GURL, GURL> origin_site_map{
{host_url, host_url},
};
CheckGetSiteForURL(browser_context(), origin_site_map);
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({single}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
CheckGetSiteForURL(browser_context(), origin_site_map);
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(wild.origin());
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(single.origin());
}
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::IsEmpty());
// Verify the first domain added remains dominant in the case of differing
// wildcard and non-wildcard statuses.
{
IsolatedOriginPattern wild("https://[*.]bar.foo.com");
IsolatedOriginPattern single("https://bar.foo.com");
GURL host_url("https://host.bar.foo.com");
GURL domain_url("https://bar.foo.com");
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({single}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
std::map<GURL, GURL> origin_site_map{
{host_url, domain_url},
};
CheckGetSiteForURL(browser_context(), origin_site_map);
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({wild}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
CheckGetSiteForURL(browser_context(), origin_site_map);
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(wild.origin());
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(single.origin());
}
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::IsEmpty());
}
// Verifies that isolated origins only apply to future BrowsingInstances.
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, DynamicIsolatedOrigins) {
url::Origin foo = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://foo.com/"));
url::Origin bar = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://bar.com/"));
url::Origin baz = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://baz.com/"));
url::Origin qux = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://qux.com/"));
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
// Initially there should be no isolated origins.
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::IsEmpty());
// Save the next BrowsingInstance ID to be created. Because unit tests run
// in batches, this isn't guaranteed to always be 1, for example if a
// previous test in the same batch had already created a SiteInstance and
// BrowsingInstance.
BrowsingInstanceId initial_id(SiteInstanceImpl::NextBrowsingInstanceId());
// Isolate foo.com and bar.com.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({foo, bar}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(
p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(GetIsolatedOriginEntry(initial_id, foo),
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(initial_id, bar)));
// Isolating bar.com again should have no effect.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({bar}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(
p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(GetIsolatedOriginEntry(initial_id, foo),
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(initial_id, bar)));
// Create a new BrowsingInstance. Its ID will be |initial_id|.
TestBrowserContext context;
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> foo_instance =
SiteInstanceImpl::CreateForTesting(&context, GURL("https://foo.com/"));
EXPECT_EQ(initial_id,
foo_instance->GetIsolationContext().browsing_instance_id());
EXPECT_EQ(BrowsingInstanceId::FromUnsafeValue(initial_id.value() + 1),
SiteInstanceImpl::NextBrowsingInstanceId());
// Isolate baz.com. This will apply to BrowsingInstances with IDs
// |initial_id + 1| and above.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({baz}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(initial_id, foo),
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(initial_id, bar),
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(initial_id.value() + 1, baz)));
// Isolating bar.com again should not update the old BrowsingInstance ID.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({bar}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(initial_id, foo),
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(initial_id, bar),
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(initial_id.value() + 1, baz)));
// Create another BrowsingInstance.
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> bar_instance =
SiteInstanceImpl::CreateForTesting(&context, GURL("https://bar.com/"));
EXPECT_EQ(BrowsingInstanceId::FromUnsafeValue(initial_id.value() + 1),
bar_instance->GetIsolationContext().browsing_instance_id());
EXPECT_EQ(BrowsingInstanceId::FromUnsafeValue(initial_id.value() + 2),
SiteInstanceImpl::NextBrowsingInstanceId());
// Isolate qux.com.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({qux}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(initial_id, foo),
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(initial_id, bar),
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(initial_id.value() + 1, baz),
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(initial_id.value() + 2, qux)));
// Check IsIsolatedOrigin() only returns isolated origins if they apply to
// the provided BrowsingInstance. foo and bar should apply in
// BrowsingInstance ID |initial_id| and above, baz in IDs |initial_id + 1|
// and above, and qux in |initial_id + 2| and above.
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, initial_id, foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, initial_id, bar));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, initial_id, baz));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, initial_id, qux));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, initial_id.value() + 1, foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, initial_id.value() + 1, bar));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, initial_id.value() + 1, baz));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, initial_id.value() + 1, qux));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, initial_id.value() + 2, foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, initial_id.value() + 2, bar));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, initial_id.value() + 2, baz));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, initial_id.value() + 2, qux));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, initial_id.value() + 42, foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, initial_id.value() + 42, bar));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, initial_id.value() + 42, baz));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, initial_id.value() + 42, qux));
// An IsolationContext constructed without a BrowsingInstance ID should
// return the latest available isolated origins.
EXPECT_TRUE(p->IsIsolatedOrigin(IsolationContext(&context), foo,
false /* origin_requests_isolation */));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->IsIsolatedOrigin(IsolationContext(&context), bar,
false /* origin_requests_isolation */));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->IsIsolatedOrigin(IsolationContext(&context), baz,
false /* origin_requests_isolation */));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->IsIsolatedOrigin(IsolationContext(&context), qux,
false /* origin_requests_isolation */));
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(foo);
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(bar);
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(baz);
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(qux);
}
// Check that an unsuccessful isolated origin lookup for a URL with an empty
// host doesn't crash. See https://crbug.com/882686.
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, IsIsolatedOriginWithEmptyHost) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
TestBrowserContext context;
EXPECT_FALSE(p->IsIsolatedOrigin(IsolationContext(&context),
url::Origin::Create(GURL()),
false /* origin_requests_isolation */));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->IsIsolatedOrigin(IsolationContext(&context),
url::Origin::Create(GURL("file:///foo")),
false /* origin_requests_isolation */));
}
// Verifies the API for restricting isolated origins to a specific
// BrowserContext (profile). Namely, the same origin may be added for
// different BrowserContexts, possibly with different BrowsingInstanceId
// cutoffs. Attempts to re-add an origin for the same profile should be
// ignored. Also, once an isolated origin is added globally for all profiles,
// future attempts to re-add it (for any profile) should also be ignored.
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest,
IsolatedOriginsForSpecificBrowserContexts) {
url::Origin foo = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://foo.com/"));
url::Origin bar = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://bar.com/"));
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
// Initially there should be no isolated origins.
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::IsEmpty());
// Save the next BrowsingInstance ID to be created. Because unit tests run
// in batches, this isn't guaranteed to always be 1, for example if a
// previous test in the same batch had already created a SiteInstance and
// BrowsingInstance.
BrowsingInstanceId initial_id(SiteInstanceImpl::NextBrowsingInstanceId());
// Isolate foo.com globally (for all BrowserContexts).
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({foo}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
TestBrowserContext context1, context2;
// Isolate bar.com in |context1|.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({bar}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST, &context1);
// bar.com should be isolated for |context1|, but not |context2|. foo.com
// should be isolated for all contexts.
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context1, initial_id, foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context2, initial_id, foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context1, initial_id, bar));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context2, initial_id, bar));
// Create a new BrowsingInstance. Its ID will be |initial_id|.
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> foo_instance =
SiteInstanceImpl::CreateForTesting(&context1, GURL("https://foo.com/"));
EXPECT_EQ(initial_id,
foo_instance->GetIsolationContext().browsing_instance_id());
EXPECT_EQ(BrowsingInstanceId::FromUnsafeValue(initial_id.value() + 1),
SiteInstanceImpl::NextBrowsingInstanceId());
EXPECT_EQ(&context1, foo_instance->GetIsolationContext()
.browser_or_resource_context()
.ToBrowserContext());
// Isolating foo.com in |context1| is allowed and should add a new
// IsolatedOriginEntry. This wouldn't introduce any additional isolation,
// since foo.com is already isolated globally, but the new entry is
// important, e.g. for persisting profile-specific isolated origins across
// restarts.
EXPECT_EQ(1, GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(foo));
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({foo}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST, &context1);
EXPECT_EQ(2, GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context1, initial_id, foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context2, initial_id, foo));
// Isolating bar.com in |context1| again should have no effect.
EXPECT_EQ(1, GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(bar));
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({bar}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST, &context1);
EXPECT_EQ(1, GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(bar));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context1, initial_id, bar));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context2, initial_id, bar));
// Isolate bar.com for |context2|, which should add a new
// IsolatedOriginEntry. Verify that the isolation took effect for
// |initial_id + 1| (the current BrowsingInstance ID cutoff) only.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({bar}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST, &context2);
EXPECT_EQ(2, GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(bar));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context2, initial_id, bar));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context2, initial_id.value() + 1, bar));
// Verify the bar.com is still isolated in |context1| starting with
// |initial_id|.
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context1, initial_id, bar));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context1, initial_id.value() + 1, bar));
// Create another BrowserContext; only foo.com should be isolated there.
TestBrowserContext context3;
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context3, initial_id, foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context3, initial_id.value() + 1, foo));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context3, initial_id, bar));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context3, initial_id.value() + 1, bar));
// Now, add bar.com as a globally isolated origin. This should make it apply
// to context3 as well, but only in initial_id + 1 (the current
// BrowsingInstance ID cutoff).
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({bar}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
EXPECT_EQ(3, GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(bar));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context3, initial_id, bar));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context3, initial_id.value() + 1, bar));
// An attempt to re-add bar.com for a new profile should create a new
// IsolatedOriginEntry, though it wouldn't provide any additional isolation,
// since bar.com is already isolated globally.
TestBrowserContext context4;
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({bar}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST, &context4);
EXPECT_EQ(4, GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(bar));
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(foo);
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(bar);
}
// This test ensures that isolated origins associated with a specific
// BrowserContext are removed when that BrowserContext is destroyed.
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest,
IsolatedOriginsRemovedWhenBrowserContextDestroyed) {
url::Origin foo = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://foo.com/"));
url::Origin sub_foo = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://sub.foo.com/"));
url::Origin bar = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://bar.com/"));
url::Origin baz = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://baz.com/"));
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
// Initially there should be no isolated origins.
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::IsEmpty());
// Save the next BrowsingInstance ID to be created. Because unit tests run
// in batches, this isn't guaranteed to always be 1, for example if a
// previous test in the same batch had already created a SiteInstance and
// BrowsingInstance.
BrowsingInstanceId initial_id(SiteInstanceImpl::NextBrowsingInstanceId());
std::unique_ptr<TestBrowserContext> context1(new TestBrowserContext());
std::unique_ptr<TestBrowserContext> context2(new TestBrowserContext());
// Isolate foo.com in |context1|. Note that sub.foo.com should also be
// considered isolated in |context1|, since it's a subdomain of foo.com.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({foo}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST,
context1.get());
EXPECT_EQ(1, GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(context1.get(), initial_id, foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(context1.get(), initial_id, sub_foo));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(context2.get(), initial_id, foo));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(context2.get(), initial_id, sub_foo));
// Isolate sub.foo.com and bar.com in |context2|.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({sub_foo, bar}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST,
context2.get());
EXPECT_EQ(1, GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(sub_foo));
EXPECT_EQ(1, GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(bar));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(context2.get(), initial_id, sub_foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(context2.get(), initial_id, bar));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(context2.get(), initial_id, foo));
// Isolate baz.com in both BrowserContexts.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({baz}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST,
context1.get());
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({baz}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST,
context2.get());
EXPECT_EQ(2, GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(baz));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(context1.get(), initial_id, baz));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(context2.get(), initial_id, baz));
// Remove |context1|. foo.com should no longer be in the isolated_origins_
// map, and the other origins should be isolated only in |context2|.
context1.reset();
EXPECT_EQ(0, GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(foo));
EXPECT_EQ(1, GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(sub_foo));
EXPECT_EQ(1, GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(bar));
EXPECT_EQ(1, GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(baz));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(context2.get(), initial_id, sub_foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(context2.get(), initial_id, bar));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(context2.get(), initial_id, baz));
// Remove |context2| and ensure the remaining entries are removed.
context2.reset();
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::IsEmpty());
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, IsolatedOriginPattern) {
const std::string_view etld1_wild("https://[*.]foo.com");
url::Origin etld1_wild_origin = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://foo.com"));
IsolatedOriginPattern p(etld1_wild);
EXPECT_TRUE(p.isolate_all_subdomains());
EXPECT_TRUE(p.is_valid());
EXPECT_EQ(p.origin(), etld1_wild_origin);
const std::string_view etld2_wild("https://[*.]bar.foo.com");
url::Origin etld2_wild_origin =
url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://bar.foo.com"));
bool result = p.Parse(etld2_wild);
EXPECT_TRUE(result);
EXPECT_TRUE(p.isolate_all_subdomains());
EXPECT_TRUE(p.is_valid());
EXPECT_EQ(p.origin(), etld2_wild_origin);
EXPECT_FALSE(p.origin().opaque());
const std::string_view etld1("https://baz.com");
url::Origin etld1_origin = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://baz.com"));
result = p.Parse(etld1);
EXPECT_TRUE(result);
EXPECT_FALSE(p.isolate_all_subdomains());
EXPECT_TRUE(p.is_valid());
EXPECT_EQ(p.origin(), etld1_origin);
EXPECT_FALSE(p.origin().opaque());
const std::string_view bad_scheme("ftp://foo.com");
result = p.Parse(bad_scheme);
EXPECT_FALSE(result);
EXPECT_FALSE(p.isolate_all_subdomains());
EXPECT_FALSE(p.is_valid());
EXPECT_TRUE(p.origin().opaque());
const std::string_view no_scheme_sep("httpsfoo.com");
result = p.Parse(no_scheme_sep);
EXPECT_FALSE(result);
EXPECT_FALSE(p.isolate_all_subdomains());
EXPECT_FALSE(p.is_valid());
EXPECT_TRUE(p.origin().opaque());
const std::string_view bad_registry("https://co.uk");
result = p.Parse(bad_registry);
EXPECT_FALSE(result);
EXPECT_FALSE(p.isolate_all_subdomains());
EXPECT_FALSE(p.is_valid());
EXPECT_TRUE(p.origin().opaque());
const std::string_view trailing_dot("https://bar.com.");
result = p.Parse(trailing_dot);
EXPECT_FALSE(result);
EXPECT_FALSE(p.isolate_all_subdomains());
EXPECT_FALSE(p.is_valid());
EXPECT_TRUE(p.origin().opaque());
const std::string_view ip_addr("https://10.20.30.40");
url::Origin ip_origin = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://10.20.30.40"));
result = p.Parse(ip_addr);
EXPECT_TRUE(result);
EXPECT_FALSE(p.isolate_all_subdomains());
EXPECT_FALSE(p.origin().opaque());
EXPECT_TRUE(p.is_valid());
EXPECT_EQ(p.origin(), ip_origin);
const std::string_view wild_ip_addr("https://[*.]10.20.30.40");
result = p.Parse(wild_ip_addr);
EXPECT_FALSE(result);
EXPECT_FALSE(p.isolate_all_subdomains());
EXPECT_FALSE(p.is_valid());
const url::Origin bad_origin;
IsolatedOriginPattern bad_pattern(bad_origin);
EXPECT_FALSE(bad_pattern.isolate_all_subdomains());
EXPECT_TRUE(bad_pattern.origin().opaque());
EXPECT_FALSE(p.is_valid());
}
// This test adds isolated origins from various sources and verifies that
// GetIsolatedOrigins() properly restricts lookups by source.
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, GetIsolatedOrigins) {
url::Origin foo = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://foo.com/"));
url::Origin bar = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://bar.com/"));
url::Origin baz = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://baz.com/"));
url::Origin qux = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://qux.com/"));
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
// Initially there should be no isolated origins.
EXPECT_THAT(p->GetIsolatedOrigins(), testing::IsEmpty());
// Add isolated origins from various sources, and verify that
// GetIsolatedOrigins properly restricts lookups by source.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({foo}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({bar}, IsolatedOriginSource::FIELD_TRIAL);
EXPECT_THAT(p->GetIsolatedOrigins(), testing::UnorderedElementsAre(foo, bar));
EXPECT_THAT(p->GetIsolatedOrigins(IsolatedOriginSource::TEST),
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(foo));
EXPECT_THAT(p->GetIsolatedOrigins(IsolatedOriginSource::FIELD_TRIAL),
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(bar));
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({baz}, IsolatedOriginSource::POLICY);
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({qux}, IsolatedOriginSource::COMMAND_LINE);
EXPECT_THAT(p->GetIsolatedOrigins(),
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(foo, bar, baz, qux));
EXPECT_THAT(p->GetIsolatedOrigins(IsolatedOriginSource::TEST),
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(foo));
EXPECT_THAT(p->GetIsolatedOrigins(IsolatedOriginSource::FIELD_TRIAL),
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(bar));
EXPECT_THAT(p->GetIsolatedOrigins(IsolatedOriginSource::POLICY),
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(baz));
EXPECT_THAT(p->GetIsolatedOrigins(IsolatedOriginSource::COMMAND_LINE),
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(qux));
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(foo);
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(bar);
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(baz);
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(qux);
EXPECT_THAT(p->GetIsolatedOrigins(), testing::IsEmpty());
}
// This test adds isolated origins from various sources as well as restricted
// to particular profiles, and verifies that GetIsolatedOrigins() properly
// restricts lookups by both source and profile.
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, GetIsolatedOriginsWithProfile) {
url::Origin foo = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://foo.com/"));
url::Origin bar = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://bar.com/"));
url::Origin baz = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://baz.com/"));
url::Origin qux = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://qux.com/"));
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
TestBrowserContext context1, context2;
// Initially there should be no isolated origins.
EXPECT_THAT(p->GetIsolatedOrigins(), testing::IsEmpty());
// Add a global isolated origin. Note that since it applies to all profiles,
// GetIsolatedOrigins() should return it for any passed-in profile.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({foo}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
// Add some per-profile isolated origins.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({bar}, IsolatedOriginSource::USER_TRIGGERED,
&context1);
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({baz}, IsolatedOriginSource::POLICY, &context2);
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({qux}, IsolatedOriginSource::USER_TRIGGERED,
&context1);
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({qux}, IsolatedOriginSource::USER_TRIGGERED,
&context2);
EXPECT_THAT(p->GetIsolatedOrigins(), testing::UnorderedElementsAre(foo));
EXPECT_THAT(p->GetIsolatedOrigins(IsolatedOriginSource::TEST),
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(foo));
EXPECT_THAT(p->GetIsolatedOrigins(IsolatedOriginSource::TEST, &context1),
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(foo));
EXPECT_THAT(p->GetIsolatedOrigins(IsolatedOriginSource::TEST, &context2),
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(foo));
EXPECT_THAT(p->GetIsolatedOrigins(IsolatedOriginSource::USER_TRIGGERED),
testing::IsEmpty());
EXPECT_THAT(
p->GetIsolatedOrigins(IsolatedOriginSource::USER_TRIGGERED, &context1),
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(bar, qux));
EXPECT_THAT(
p->GetIsolatedOrigins(IsolatedOriginSource::USER_TRIGGERED, &context2),
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(qux));
EXPECT_THAT(p->GetIsolatedOrigins(IsolatedOriginSource::POLICY),
testing::IsEmpty());
EXPECT_THAT(p->GetIsolatedOrigins(IsolatedOriginSource::POLICY, &context1),
testing::IsEmpty());
EXPECT_THAT(p->GetIsolatedOrigins(IsolatedOriginSource::POLICY, &context2),
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(baz));
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(foo);
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(bar);
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(baz);
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(qux);
EXPECT_THAT(p->GetIsolatedOrigins(), testing::IsEmpty());
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, IsolatedOriginPatternEquality) {
std::string foo("https://foo.com");
std::string foo_port("https://foo.com:8000");
std::string foo_path("https://foo.com/some/path");
EXPECT_EQ(IsolatedOriginPattern(foo), IsolatedOriginPattern(foo_port));
EXPECT_EQ(IsolatedOriginPattern(foo), IsolatedOriginPattern(foo_path));
std::string wild_foo("https://[*.]foo.com");
std::string wild_foo_port("https://[*.]foo.com:8000");
std::string wild_foo_path("https://[*.]foo.com/some/path");
EXPECT_EQ(IsolatedOriginPattern(wild_foo),
IsolatedOriginPattern(wild_foo_port));
EXPECT_EQ(IsolatedOriginPattern(wild_foo),
IsolatedOriginPattern(wild_foo_path));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsolatedOriginPattern(foo) == IsolatedOriginPattern(wild_foo));
}
// Verifies parsing logic in SiteIsolationPolicy::ParseIsolatedOrigins.
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, ParseIsolatedOrigins) {
EXPECT_THAT(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::ParseIsolatedOrigins(""),
testing::IsEmpty());
// Single simple, valid origin.
EXPECT_THAT(
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::ParseIsolatedOrigins(
"http://isolated.foo.com"),
testing::ElementsAre(IsolatedOriginPattern("http://isolated.foo.com")));
// Multiple comma-separated origins.
EXPECT_THAT(
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::ParseIsolatedOrigins(
"http://a.com,https://b.com,,https://c.com:8000"),
testing::ElementsAre(IsolatedOriginPattern("http://a.com"),
IsolatedOriginPattern("https://b.com"),
IsolatedOriginPattern("https://c.com:8000")));
// ParseIsolatedOrigins should not do any deduplication (that is the job of
// ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::AddFutureIsolatedOrigins).
EXPECT_THAT(
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::ParseIsolatedOrigins(
"https://b.com,https://b.com,https://b.com:1234"),
testing::ElementsAre(IsolatedOriginPattern("https://b.com"),
IsolatedOriginPattern("https://b.com"),
IsolatedOriginPattern("https://b.com:1234")));
// A single wildcard origin.
EXPECT_THAT(
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::ParseIsolatedOrigins(
"https://[*.]wild.foo.com"),
testing::ElementsAre(IsolatedOriginPattern("https://[*.]wild.foo.com")));
// A mixture of wildcard and non-wildcard origins.
EXPECT_THAT(
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::ParseIsolatedOrigins(
"https://[*.]wild.foo.com,https://isolated.foo.com"),
testing::ElementsAre(IsolatedOriginPattern("https://[*.]wild.foo.com"),
IsolatedOriginPattern("https://isolated.foo.com")));
}
// Verify that the default port for an isolated origin's scheme is returned
// during a lookup, not the port of the origin requested.
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, WildcardDefaultPort) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
EXPECT_THAT(p->GetIsolatedOrigins(), testing::IsEmpty());
url::Origin isolated_origin_with_port =
url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://isolated.com:1234"));
url::Origin isolated_origin =
url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://isolated.com"));
url::Origin wild_with_port =
url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://a.wild.com:5678"));
url::Origin wild_origin = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://a.wild.com"));
IsolatedOriginPattern wild_pattern("https://[*.]wild.com:5678");
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({isolated_origin_with_port},
IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({wild_pattern}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
IsolationContext isolation_context(browser_context());
url::Origin lookup_origin;
// Requesting isolated_origin_with_port should return the same origin but with
// the default port for the scheme.
const bool kOriginRequestsIsolation = false;
EXPECT_TRUE(p->GetMatchingProcessIsolatedOrigin(
isolation_context, isolated_origin_with_port, kOriginRequestsIsolation,
&lookup_origin));
EXPECT_EQ(url::DefaultPortForScheme(lookup_origin.scheme()),
lookup_origin.port());
EXPECT_EQ(isolated_origin, lookup_origin);
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(isolated_origin);
// Similarly, looking up matching isolated origins for wildcard origins must
// also return the default port for the origin's scheme, not the report of the
// requested origin.
EXPECT_TRUE(p->GetMatchingProcessIsolatedOrigin(
isolation_context, wild_with_port, kOriginRequestsIsolation,
&lookup_origin));
EXPECT_EQ(url::DefaultPortForScheme(lookup_origin.scheme()),
lookup_origin.port());
EXPECT_EQ(wild_origin, lookup_origin);
p->RemoveIsolatedOriginForTesting(wild_pattern.origin());
EXPECT_THAT(p->GetIsolatedOrigins(), testing::IsEmpty());
}
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, ProcessLockMatching) {
GURL nonapp_url("https://bar.com/");
GURL app_url("https://some.app.foo.com/");
GURL app_effective_url("https://app.com/");
EffectiveURLContentBrowserClient modified_client(
app_url, app_effective_url, /* requires_dedicated_process */ true);
ContentBrowserClient* original_client =
SetBrowserClientForTesting(&modified_client);
IsolationContext isolation_context(browser_context());
auto nonapp_urlinfo = UrlInfo::CreateForTesting(
nonapp_url, CreateStoragePartitionConfigForTesting());
auto ui_nonapp_url_siteinfo =
SiteInfo::Create(isolation_context, nonapp_urlinfo);
auto ui_nonapp_url_lock =
ProcessLock::Create(isolation_context, nonapp_urlinfo);
auto app_urlinfo = UrlInfo::CreateForTesting(
app_url, CreateStoragePartitionConfigForTesting());
auto ui_app_url_lock = ProcessLock::Create(isolation_context, app_urlinfo);
auto ui_app_url_siteinfo = SiteInfo::Create(isolation_context, app_urlinfo);
SiteInfo io_nonapp_url_siteinfo(browser_context());
ProcessLock io_nonapp_url_lock;
SiteInfo io_app_url_siteinfo(browser_context());
ProcessLock io_app_url_lock;
base::WaitableEvent io_locks_set_event;
// Post a task that will compute ProcessLocks for the same URLs in the
// IO thread.
GetIOThreadTaskRunner({})->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindLambdaForTesting([&]() {
io_nonapp_url_siteinfo =
SiteInfo::CreateOnIOThread(isolation_context, nonapp_urlinfo);
io_nonapp_url_lock =
ProcessLock::Create(isolation_context, nonapp_urlinfo);
io_app_url_siteinfo =
SiteInfo::CreateOnIOThread(isolation_context, app_urlinfo);
io_app_url_lock = ProcessLock::Create(isolation_context, app_urlinfo);
// Tell the UI thread have computed the locks.
io_locks_set_event.Signal();
}));
io_locks_set_event.Wait();
// Expect URLs with effective URLs that match the original URL to have
// matching SiteInfos and matching ProcessLocks.
EXPECT_EQ(ui_nonapp_url_siteinfo, io_nonapp_url_siteinfo);
EXPECT_EQ(ui_nonapp_url_lock, io_nonapp_url_lock);
// Expect hosted app URLs where the effective URL does not match the original
// URL to have different SiteInfos but matching process locks. The SiteInfos,
// are expected to be different because the effective URL cannot be computed
// from the IO thread. This means the site_url fields will differ.
EXPECT_NE(ui_app_url_siteinfo, io_app_url_siteinfo);
EXPECT_NE(ui_app_url_siteinfo.site_url(), io_app_url_siteinfo.site_url());
EXPECT_EQ(ui_app_url_siteinfo.process_lock_url(),
io_app_url_siteinfo.process_lock_url());
EXPECT_EQ(ui_app_url_lock, io_app_url_lock);
SetBrowserClientForTesting(original_client);
}
// Verify the mechanism that allows non-origin-keyed isolated origins to be
// associated with a single BrowsingInstance.
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest,
IsolatedOriginsForSpecificBrowsingInstances) {
url::Origin foo = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://foo.com/"));
url::Origin bar = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://bar.com/"));
url::Origin baz = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://baz.com/"));
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
// Initially there should be no isolated origins.
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::IsEmpty());
// Create SiteInstances for foo.com, bar.com, and baz.com, with each
// SiteInstance in a new BrowsingInstance.
TestBrowserContext context;
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> foo_instance =
SiteInstanceImpl::CreateForTesting(&context, GURL("https://foo.com/"));
auto foo_browsing_instance_id =
foo_instance->GetIsolationContext().browsing_instance_id();
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> bar_instance =
SiteInstanceImpl::CreateForTesting(&context, GURL("https://bar.com/"));
auto bar_browsing_instance_id =
bar_instance->GetIsolationContext().browsing_instance_id();
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> baz_instance =
SiteInstanceImpl::CreateForTesting(&context, GURL("https://baz.com/"));
auto baz_browsing_instance_id =
baz_instance->GetIsolationContext().browsing_instance_id();
// Isolate foo.com for `foo_instance`'s BrowsingInstance only.
p->AddCoopIsolatedOriginForBrowsingInstance(
foo_instance->GetIsolationContext(), foo, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(
p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(GetIsolatedOriginEntry(
&context, false /* applies_to_future_browsing_instances */,
foo_browsing_instance_id, foo)));
// Verify that foo.com is isolated only in the `foo_instance`'s
// BrowsingInstance, and no other origins are isolated in any other
// BrowsingInstances.
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, foo_browsing_instance_id, foo));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, foo_browsing_instance_id, bar));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, foo_browsing_instance_id, baz));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, bar_browsing_instance_id, foo));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, bar_browsing_instance_id, bar));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, bar_browsing_instance_id, baz));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, baz_browsing_instance_id, foo));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, baz_browsing_instance_id, bar));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, baz_browsing_instance_id, baz));
// Verify that subdomains of foo.com are part of the foo.com
// isolated origin (i.e., that foo.com is not origin-keyed).
EXPECT_TRUE(
IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, foo_browsing_instance_id,
url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://sub.foo.com"))));
EXPECT_TRUE(
IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, foo_browsing_instance_id,
url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://sub2.sub.foo.com"))));
// Isolating foo.com again in the same BrowsingInstance should have no
// effect.
p->AddCoopIsolatedOriginForBrowsingInstance(
foo_instance->GetIsolationContext(), foo, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
EXPECT_EQ(1, GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(foo));
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(
p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(GetIsolatedOriginEntry(
&context, false /* applies_to_future_browsing_instances */,
foo_browsing_instance_id, foo)));
// Isolate baz.com in `baz_browsing_instance`'s BrowsingInstance.
p->AddCoopIsolatedOriginForBrowsingInstance(
baz_instance->GetIsolationContext(), baz, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(
p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::UnorderedElementsAre(
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(
&context, false /* applies_to_future_browsing_instances */,
foo_browsing_instance_id, foo),
GetIsolatedOriginEntry(
&context, false /* applies_to_future_browsing_instances */,
baz_browsing_instance_id, baz)));
// Verify that foo.com is isolated in the `foo_instance`'s BrowsingInstance,
// and baz.com is isolated in `baz_instance`'s BrowsingInstance.
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, foo_browsing_instance_id, foo));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, foo_browsing_instance_id, bar));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, foo_browsing_instance_id, baz));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, bar_browsing_instance_id, foo));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, bar_browsing_instance_id, bar));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, bar_browsing_instance_id, baz));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, baz_browsing_instance_id, foo));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, baz_browsing_instance_id, bar));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, baz_browsing_instance_id, baz));
// Isolate bar.com in foo.com (not bar.com)'s BrowsingInstance.
p->AddCoopIsolatedOriginForBrowsingInstance(
foo_instance->GetIsolationContext(), bar, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
// Verify that foo.com and bar.com are both isolated in `foo_instance`'s
// BrowsingInstance, nothing is isolated in bar_instance's BrowsingInstance,
// and baz.com is isolated in `baz_instance`'s BrowsingInstance.
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, foo_browsing_instance_id, foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, foo_browsing_instance_id, bar));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, foo_browsing_instance_id, baz));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, bar_browsing_instance_id, foo));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, bar_browsing_instance_id, bar));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, bar_browsing_instance_id, baz));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, baz_browsing_instance_id, foo));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, baz_browsing_instance_id, bar));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, baz_browsing_instance_id, baz));
// Isolate foo.com in `bar_instance` and `baz_instance`'s BrowsingInstances
// and verify that this takes effect. This should result in having three
// entries for foo.com, one for each BrowsingInstance.
p->AddCoopIsolatedOriginForBrowsingInstance(
bar_instance->GetIsolationContext(), foo, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
p->AddCoopIsolatedOriginForBrowsingInstance(
baz_instance->GetIsolationContext(), foo, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, foo_browsing_instance_id, foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, foo_browsing_instance_id, bar));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, foo_browsing_instance_id, baz));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, bar_browsing_instance_id, foo));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, bar_browsing_instance_id, bar));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, bar_browsing_instance_id, baz));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, baz_browsing_instance_id, foo));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, baz_browsing_instance_id, bar));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, baz_browsing_instance_id, baz));
EXPECT_EQ(3, GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(foo));
// Simulate foo_instance and its BrowsingInstance going away. This should
// remove the corresponding BrowsingInstance-specific entries in
// ChildProcessSecurityPolicy, since they are no longer needed.
p->SetBrowsingInstanceCleanupDelayForTesting(0);
foo_instance.reset();
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, foo_browsing_instance_id, foo));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, foo_browsing_instance_id, bar));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, foo_browsing_instance_id, baz));
// Other BrowsingInstances shouldn't be affected.
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, bar_browsing_instance_id, foo));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, bar_browsing_instance_id, bar));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, bar_browsing_instance_id, baz));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, baz_browsing_instance_id, foo));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, baz_browsing_instance_id, bar));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, baz_browsing_instance_id, baz));
p->ClearIsolatedOriginsForTesting();
}
// Verify isolated origins associated with a single BrowsingInstance can be
// combined with isolated origins that apply to future BrowsingInstances.
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest,
IsolatedOriginsForCurrentAndFutureBrowsingInstances) {
url::Origin foo = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://foo.com/"));
url::Origin bar = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://bar.com/"));
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
// Initially there should be no isolated origins.
LOCKED_EXPECT_THAT(p->isolated_origins_lock_, p->isolated_origins_,
testing::IsEmpty());
// Create a SiteInstance for foo.com in a new BrowsingInstance.
TestBrowserContext context;
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> foo_instance =
SiteInstanceImpl::CreateForTesting(&context, GURL("https://foo.com/"));
auto foo_browsing_instance_id =
foo_instance->GetIsolationContext().browsing_instance_id();
// Isolate foo.com for `foo_instance`'s BrowsingInstance only.
p->AddCoopIsolatedOriginForBrowsingInstance(
foo_instance->GetIsolationContext(), foo, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
EXPECT_EQ(1, GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(foo));
// Create a SiteInstance for bar.com in a new BrowsingInstance.
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> bar_instance =
SiteInstanceImpl::CreateForTesting(&context, GURL("https://bar.com/"));
auto bar_browsing_instance_id =
bar_instance->GetIsolationContext().browsing_instance_id();
// Isolate foo.com for all future BrowsingInstances (with IDs `future_id` or
// above). Note that this shouldn't apply to the existing BrowsingInstances
// for foo_instance and bar_instance.
BrowsingInstanceId future_id(SiteInstanceImpl::NextBrowsingInstanceId());
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({foo}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST, &context);
// We should now have two entries for foo.com, one for
// foo_browsing_instance_id, and one for future_id.
EXPECT_EQ(2, GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(foo));
// Verify that foo.com is isolated in the `foo_instance`'s BrowsingInstance,
// as well as future BrowsingInstance IDs.
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, foo_browsing_instance_id, foo));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, bar_browsing_instance_id, foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, future_id, foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, future_id.value() + 42, foo));
// Other origins shouldn't be isolated.
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, foo_browsing_instance_id, bar));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, bar_browsing_instance_id, bar));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, future_id, bar));
// An attempt to add foo.com for a specific BrowsingInstance which has ID
// greater than `future_id` should be ignored, since that's already covered
// by the second foo.com entry that applies to future BrowsingInstances.
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> future_instance =
SiteInstanceImpl::CreateForTesting(&context, GURL("https://foo.com/"));
EXPECT_EQ(future_id,
future_instance->GetIsolationContext().browsing_instance_id());
p->AddCoopIsolatedOriginForBrowsingInstance(
future_instance->GetIsolationContext(), foo, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
EXPECT_EQ(2, GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(foo));
// Likewise, an attempt to re-add foo.com for future BrowsingInstances should
// be ignored.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({foo}, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST, &context);
EXPECT_EQ(2, GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(foo));
// However, we can still add foo.com isolation to a BrowsingInstance that
// precedes `future_id` and doesn't match `foo_browsing_instance_id`. Check
// this with `bar_instance`'s BrowsingInstance.
EXPECT_LT(bar_browsing_instance_id, future_id);
p->AddCoopIsolatedOriginForBrowsingInstance(
bar_instance->GetIsolationContext(), foo, IsolatedOriginSource::TEST);
EXPECT_EQ(3, GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, foo_browsing_instance_id, foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, bar_browsing_instance_id, foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, future_id, foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, future_id.value() + 42, foo));
// When foo_instance and its BrowsingInstance goes away, the corresponding
// entry just for that BrowsingInstance entry should be destroyed, but other
// entries should remain.
p->SetBrowsingInstanceCleanupDelayForTesting(0);
foo_instance.reset();
EXPECT_EQ(2, GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(foo));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, foo_browsing_instance_id, foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, bar_browsing_instance_id, foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, future_id, foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, future_id.value() + 42, foo));
// Destroying a BrowsingInstance with ID `future_id` shouldn't affect the
// entry that applies to future BrowsingInstances.
future_instance.reset();
EXPECT_EQ(2, GetIsolatedOriginEntryCount(foo));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, foo_browsing_instance_id, foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, bar_browsing_instance_id, foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, future_id, foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(IsIsolatedOrigin(&context, future_id.value() + 42, foo));
p->ClearIsolatedOriginsForTesting();
}
// This test verifies that CanAccessDataForOrigin returns true for a process id
// even if all BrowsingInstanceIDs for that process have been deleted, so long
// as the request matches the process' lock. This test sets an origin-keyed
// lock.
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, NoBrowsingInstanceIDs_OriginKeyed) {
url::Origin foo = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://sub.foo.com/"));
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
p->SetBrowsingInstanceCleanupDelayForTesting(0);
// Create a SiteInstance for sub.foo.com in a new BrowsingInstance.
TestBrowserContext context;
{
auto origin_isolation_request = static_cast<
UrlInfo::OriginIsolationRequest>(
UrlInfo::OriginIsolationRequest::kOriginAgentClusterByHeader |
UrlInfo::OriginIsolationRequest::kRequiresOriginKeyedProcessByHeader);
UrlInfo url_info(UrlInfoInit(foo.GetURL())
.WithOriginIsolationRequest(origin_isolation_request));
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> foo_instance =
SiteInstanceImpl::CreateForUrlInfo(
&context, url_info,
/*is_guest=*/false,
/*is_fenced=*/false,
/*is_fixed_storage_partition=*/false);
p->Add(kRendererID, &context);
p->LockProcess(foo_instance->GetIsolationContext(), kRendererID,
/*is_process_used=*/false,
ProcessLock::FromSiteInfo(foo_instance->GetSiteInfo()));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->GetProcessLock(kRendererID).is_locked_to_site());
EXPECT_TRUE(p->GetProcessLock(kRendererID).is_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_EQ(foo.GetURL(), p->GetProcessLock(kRendererID).lock_url());
EXPECT_TRUE(ProcessLock::FromSiteInfo(foo_instance->GetSiteInfo())
.is_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_TRUE(p->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
foo_instance->GetIsolationContext(), foo,
OriginAgentClusterIsolationState::CreateNonIsolated())
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
}
// At this point foo_instance has gone away, and all BrowsingInstanceIDs
// associated with kRendererID have been cleaned up.
EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<size_t>(0),
p->BrowsingInstanceIdCountForTesting(kRendererID));
// Because the ProcessLock is origin-keyed, we expect sub.foo.com to match but
// not foo.com.
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanAccessDataForOrigin(kRendererID, foo));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanAccessDataForOrigin(
kRendererID, url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://foo.com/"))));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanAccessDataForOrigin(
kRendererID, url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://bar.com/"))));
// We need to remove it otherwise other tests may fail.
p->Remove(kRendererID);
}
// This test verifies that CanAccessDataForOrigin returns true for a process id
// even if all BrowsingInstanceIDs for that process have been deleted, so long
// as the request matches the process' lock. This test sets a site-keyed lock.
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest_NoOriginKeyedProcessesByDefault,
NoBrowsingInstanceIDs_SiteKeyed) {
url::Origin foo = url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://sub.foo.com/"));
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
p->SetBrowsingInstanceCleanupDelayForTesting(0);
// Create a SiteInstance for sub.foo.com in a new BrowsingInstance.
TestBrowserContext context;
{
p->Add(kRendererID, &context);
// Isolate foo.com so we can't get a default SiteInstance. This will mean
// that https://sub.foo.com will end up in a site-keyed SiteInstance, which
// is what we need.
p->AddFutureIsolatedOrigins({url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://foo.com"))},
IsolatedOriginSource::TEST, &context);
UrlInfo url_info(UrlInfoInit(foo.GetURL()));
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> foo_instance =
SiteInstanceImpl::CreateForUrlInfo(
&context, url_info,
/*is_guest=*/false,
/*is_fenced=*/false,
/*is_fixed_storage_partition=*/false);
p->LockProcess(foo_instance->GetIsolationContext(), kRendererID,
/*is_process_used=*/false,
ProcessLock::FromSiteInfo(foo_instance->GetSiteInfo()));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->GetProcessLock(kRendererID).is_locked_to_site());
EXPECT_FALSE(p->GetProcessLock(kRendererID).is_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_EQ(SiteInfo::GetSiteForOrigin(foo),
p->GetProcessLock(kRendererID).lock_url());
EXPECT_FALSE(ProcessLock::FromSiteInfo(foo_instance->GetSiteInfo())
.is_origin_keyed_process());
EXPECT_FALSE(p->DetermineOriginAgentClusterIsolation(
foo_instance->GetIsolationContext(), foo,
OriginAgentClusterIsolationState::CreateNonIsolated())
.requires_origin_keyed_process());
}
// At this point foo_instance has gone away, and all BrowsingInstanceIDs
// associated with kRendererID have been cleaned up.
EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<size_t>(0),
p->BrowsingInstanceIdCountForTesting(kRendererID));
// Because the ProcessLock is site-keyed, it should match foo.com and all
// sub-origins.
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanAccessDataForOrigin(kRendererID, foo));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->CanAccessDataForOrigin(
kRendererID, url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://foo.com/"))));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanAccessDataForOrigin(
kRendererID, url::Origin::Create(GURL("https://bar.com/"))));
// We need to remove it otherwise other tests may fail.
p->Remove(kRendererID);
}
// This test verifies that CanAccessDataForOrigin returns false for a process id
// when all BrowsingInstanceIDs for that process have been deleted, and the
// ProcessLock has is_locked_to_site() = false, regardless of the url requested.
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, NoBrowsingInstanceIDs_UnlockedProcess) {
GURL foo_url = GURL("https://foo.com/");
url::Origin foo = url::Origin::Create(foo_url);
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
p->SetBrowsingInstanceCleanupDelayForTesting(0);
// Make sure feature list command-line options are set in a way that forces
// default SiteInstance creation on all platforms.
base::test::ScopedFeatureList feature_list;
feature_list.InitWithFeatures(
/* enable */ {features::kProcessSharingWithDefaultSiteInstances},
/* disable */ {features::kProcessSharingWithStrictSiteInstances});
EXPECT_TRUE(base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kProcessSharingWithDefaultSiteInstances));
EXPECT_FALSE(base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kProcessSharingWithStrictSiteInstances));
base::test::ScopedCommandLine scoped_command_line;
// Disable site isolation so we can get default SiteInstances on all
// platforms.
scoped_command_line.GetProcessCommandLine()->AppendSwitch(
switches::kDisableSiteIsolation);
// If --site-per-process was manually appended, remove it; this interferes
// with default SiteInstances.
scoped_command_line.GetProcessCommandLine()->RemoveSwitch(
switches::kSitePerProcess);
EXPECT_FALSE(SiteIsolationPolicy::UseDedicatedProcessesForAllSites());
EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<size_t>(0),
p->BrowsingInstanceIdCountForTesting(kRendererID));
TestBrowserContext context;
{
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> foo_instance =
SiteInstanceImpl::CreateForTesting(&context, foo_url);
// Adds the process with an "allow_any_site" lock.
// The next two statements are basically AddForTesting(...), but with a
// BrowsingInstanceId based on `foo_instance` and not pinned to '1'.
// This is important when this test is run with other tests, as then
// BrowsingInstanceId will not be '1' in general.
p->Add(kRendererID, &context);
p->LockProcess(foo_instance->GetIsolationContext(), kRendererID,
/*is_process_used=*/false,
ProcessLock::CreateAllowAnySite(
StoragePartitionConfig::CreateDefault(&context),
WebExposedIsolationInfo::CreateNonIsolated()));
EXPECT_TRUE(foo_instance->IsDefaultSiteInstance());
EXPECT_TRUE(foo_instance->HasSite());
EXPECT_EQ(foo_instance->GetSiteInfo(),
SiteInfo::CreateForDefaultSiteInstance(
foo_instance->GetIsolationContext(),
StoragePartitionConfig::CreateDefault(&context),
WebExposedIsolationInfo::CreateNonIsolated()));
EXPECT_FALSE(foo_instance->RequiresDedicatedProcess());
}
// At this point foo_instance has gone away, and all BrowsingInstanceIDs
// associated with kRendererID have been cleaned up.
EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<size_t>(0),
p->BrowsingInstanceIdCountForTesting(kRendererID));
EXPECT_FALSE(p->GetProcessLock(kRendererID).is_locked_to_site());
// Ensure that we don't allow the process to keep accessing data for foo after
// all of the BrowsingInstances are gone, since that would require checking
// whether foo itself requires a dedicated process.
EXPECT_FALSE(p->CanAccessDataForOrigin(kRendererID, foo));
// We need to remove it otherwise other tests may fail.
p->Remove(kRendererID);
}
// Regression test for https://crbug.com/1324407.
TEST_F(ChildProcessSecurityPolicyTest, CannotLockUsedProcessToSite) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* p =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
TestBrowserContext context;
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> foo_instance =
SiteInstanceImpl::CreateForTesting(&context, GURL("https://foo.com"));
scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> bar_instance =
SiteInstanceImpl::CreateForTesting(&context, GURL("https://bar.com"));
// Start by putting foo.com into an allows-any-site process.
p->Add(kRendererID, &context);
p->LockProcess(foo_instance->GetIsolationContext(), kRendererID,
/*is_process_used=*/false,
ProcessLock::CreateAllowAnySite(
StoragePartitionConfig::CreateDefault(&context),
WebExposedIsolationInfo::CreateNonIsolated()));
EXPECT_TRUE(p->GetProcessLock(kRendererID).allows_any_site());
EXPECT_FALSE(p->GetProcessLock(kRendererID).is_locked_to_site());
// If the process is then considered used (e.g., by loading content), it
// should not be possible to lock it to another site.
EXPECT_CHECK_DEATH_WITH(
{
p->LockProcess(bar_instance->GetIsolationContext(), kRendererID,
/*is_process_used=*/true,
ProcessLock::FromSiteInfo(bar_instance->GetSiteInfo()));
},
"Cannot lock an already used process to .*bar\\.com");
// We need to remove it otherwise other tests may fail.
p->Remove(kRendererID);
}
} // namespace content